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I study the effect of foreign exchange reserve accumulation on domestic finan-
cial markets. Central banks sterilize reserve purchases through sales and issuance of
domestic debts. Therefore, reserves are funded by central banks’ domestic borrow-
ing. Public borrowing affects credit allocation in domestic financial markets. First,
it reduces total credit to private sector. Second, as creditors adjust their portfolio
after taking over public debts, different debtors are differently affected according to
their risk-return characteristics.
The first chapter studies how sterilized accumulation of reserves affects bank
lending. I develop a model of imperfect capital mobility where reserve is accumu-
lated by the central bank’s borrowing. The model analytically shows that reserve
accumulation crowds out bank loans. I examine monthly balance sheets of all Ko-
rean banks from September 2003 to August 2008 and find that bank lending declined
after reserve accumulation. The crowding-out coefficient, defined as the ratio of re-
duced lending to accumulated reserves, is estimated to be 0.5. I further investigate
whether reserve accumulation leads banks to cut lending by examining bank char-
acteristics that can make some banks more responsive to reserve accumulation than
others. I find that strong banks(highly capitalized, large size banks with abundant
core deposits), which can expand lending easily, cut loans more. Also, foreign bank
branches, which specialize more in security trading than loan provision, cut loans
more aggressively compared to domestic banks.
The second chapter continues by examining the effect of reserve accumulation
on firms’ financial constraints. I build a model of reserve accumulation with hetero-
geneous firms and show differential crowding out effects of reserve accumulation on
different-sized firms. The negative effect from reserve accumulation is larger on large
firms that issue debt securities more substitutable with risk-free, low-return central
bank papers. Using firm level data from Korea during 1999 to 2007, I measure firm
financial constraints using investment-cash sensitivity regressions. I find that large
firms become more financially constrained after reserve accumulation, whereas small
firms are not affected. The large firms’ investment loss in the sample amounts to
0.5% of GDP per every 1% of GDP reserve accumulation.
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Foreign exchange reserve management is an important policy instrument to
open economies. Countries can alleviate the negative impact of volatile international
capital flows by managing international reserves properly. Reserve accumulation can
bound exchange rate appreciation, thereby backing export-oriented growth. Decu-
mulation of reserves can slow down the pace of currency depreciation and help
preventing a sharper external adjustment. FX reserve management policy is used
popularly and heavily in many countries. Indeed, the literature revealed that in-
ternational reserve flow is one of the most important determinant of a country’s
equilibrium capital flow.
Foreign exchange reserve came into the focus of research interest years before
the global financial crisis. Following up the capital account opening of the 1990s,
many countries in the world increased international reserve holdings. Especially,
east Asian countries started aggressive saving in the wake of the Asian crisis of the
late 1990s. Reserve accumulation accounted for a large share of the global imbalance
developed over 2000-2008. As such, many discussions were made on the origin of the
“global saving glut”. A group of researchers paid attention to the precautionary
motive against sudden stops (Durdu et al. (2009), Obstfeld et al. (2010), Jeanne and
Ranciere (2011)), while there are others finding out merchantilist motives (Dooley
et al. (2004), Rodrik (2008), Korinek and Serven (2010)). Despite the attention,
however, the domestic consequence of reserve accumulation is not well investigated
as most researches focus on the benefits of reserves.
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No lunch is free in economics. There are costs for holding reserves. The most
obvious one is the carry cost of reserves. Holding international reserves in the asset
side, central banks or governments have corresponding debt. The return differential
of the two items generates fiscal losses. Or, the economy as a whole, including
private sector, the return on reserve assets can be compared with the country’s
external borrowing rate, since the reserve could have been used to pay back external
debt. The cost of reserve holding measured by this static comparison of return rates
often ranges around 1% of GDP for heavy accumulators. (Rodrik (2006), Adler and
Mano (2016)) The carry cost of reserves, however, does not consider the distortion
created in the course of stockpiling foreign exchange reserve. What happens in the
domestic financial market when reserves are being accumulated remain unexplained
in the literature.
Reserves are funded by domestic borrowing. It is documented that reserve
accumulation is almost fully sterilized through issuance and sales of domestic debts
by central banks. Most countries use interest rate targets for their monetary policy
implementation. This means that any purchase of foreign exchange would be auto-
matically sterilized not to make interest rate deviate from the target. In this sense,
sterilized reserve accumulation is a swap of foreign exchange with public debt. The
domestic borrowing of monetary authority can alter credit allocation in domestic
financial markets and influence bank loans and firm investment. A monetary au-
thority must be a major player in a local financial market and thus, its action has
significant impact. Policy makers need to be well informed about the unintended
impact of their decision.
iii
This dissertation investigates the distortion of reserve accumulation in two
aspects, the effects on bank loans and firm investments. Chapter 1 examines the
impact on bank loans and Chapter 2 studies the firm financial constraints and in-
vestments. In both chapters, I begin with a simple theoretical model to characterize
the mechanism. Unlike most existing models on FX reserves, I model reserves as
being accumulated by the central bank’s domestic borrowing. By introducing im-
perfection in international capital market, I show that reserve accumulation crowds
out bank loans and firm investment, and that heterogeneity in banks and firms plays
an important role.
In each chapter, I investigate data from Korea for the period before the Great
Recession. Chapter 1 examines the bank level data and Chapter 2 investigates the
firm level data. Korea is one of the most typical reserve accumulating countries
and suitable for this study. I find that reserve accumulation is associated with
reduction in bank loans and firm investment. Furthermore, I find that the effects
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Chapter 1: Reserve Accumulation and Bank Lending
1.1 Introduction
International reserve management is an important policy tool for small open
economies facing volatile capital flows. Following the capital account opening of
the 1990s, many countries, both in emerging and advanced economies, accumulated
considerable amounts of reserves. Figure 1.1 compares the reserve to GDP ratio of
2000 with that of 2015. The ratio increased significantly in most countries over the
last 15 years. The average increase of the ratio in the 33 countries is 9.7% points.
This chapter examines the effects of reserve accumulation on bank lending.
Despite the popularity of reserve policy, the existing literature on foreign exchange
reserves is mainly concentrated on the motivations and benefits of reserve hoard-
ing, while domestic consequences are given little attention. Discussions on the cost
of reserve accumulation are mostly focused on the carry cost, which is estimated
by comparing the return on reserve assets and the cost of corresponding liabilities.
What happens in the domestic financial market in the process of central bank opera-
tions for reserve accumulation has not been addressed. By investigating how reserve
accumulation affects domestic credit allocation, this paper aims to fill in this gap in
the literature.
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Notes: Data is from the World Bank. 45 degree line is provided for comparison.
Eurozone countries are excluded. Very small countries with 2015 GDP smaller than
100 billion USD are excluded. Hong Kong(62%, 112%) and Singapore(84%, 86%) are
not displayed due to extreme values. Total of 33 countries are shown in the plot.
Conceptually, reserve accumulation is the same as foreign saving funded by
central banks’ domestic borrowing. It has been documented in the literature that
heavy reserve accumulator countries have sterilized most of their reserve purchases.
(See Lavigne (2008), Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), Aizenman and Glick (2009)
or Mehrotra (2012)) Central banks have also declared that they absorb excessive
liquidity after FX purchases.1 To nullify the expansionary effect of reserve purchases
on target interest rates, the central bank has to reduce its net domestic assets.
Whether the sterilization is done through issuance of central banks’ own securities,
transfers from government, or raising reserve requirements, it amounts to central
1For example, the Bank of Korea states in the 2004 annual report(The Bank of Korea (2004))
that “During the year, the Bank of Korea had no option but to absorb the excess liquidity supplied
through the foreign sector owing to the widened current account surplus by means of the issue of
Monetary Stabilization Bonds (MSBs) in order to maintain the call rate at its target level.”
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banks’ borrowing from the domestic financial sector. The proceeds of this borrowing
are exchanged with foreign currency in the local FX market and invested abroad in
mostly safe assets.
Reserves were accumulated on a large scale, often dozens of percent of GDP,
in many countries. The flip side is that central banks borrowed heavily from the
domestic financial sector. Central banks’ large scale borrowing could have serious
implications in local financial markets. It may alter financial intermediaries’ behav-
ior and influence credit allocation in distortionary ways.2 In this paper, I focus on
banks’ loan provision to private firms.
This paper shows that reserve accumulation reduces bank loans to firms. As
central banks fund reserve purchases by borrowing from the domestic financial sec-
tor, banks are left with less funds. If domestic assets are imperfect substitutes for
foreign assets so that the banks cannot borrow from abroad the same amount they
lend to the central bank, banks would need to reduce loans to firms. I describe this
mechanism by developing a simple two-period small open economy model, and pro-
vide empirical evidence from Korean banks’ monthly balance sheets over September
2003 to August 2008.
The analytical model describes the mechanism of crowding-out. On top of
an otherwise standard FX intervention model, I introduce production, capital and
loans. The model assumes that reserves are funded by domestic borrowing. As
the central bank channels funds abroad, the local financial market becomes short
2For instance, banks may opt to increase the riskiness of their portfolio to offset the effect of
low yield sterilization assets that they are forced to hold. The second chapter discusses this effect.
See also Yu (2014) for similar argument with Chinese reserve accumulation case, and Kumhof and
Tanner (2005) for discussion on the effect of government debt on bank portfolio.
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of funds and tries to borrow more from abroad. But the foreign demand for home
bonds is finitely elastic. International financial intermediation is subject to a lim-
ited liability constraint and uncovered interest rate parity fails. The private sector
can only partially offset the public outflows, so Ricardian equivalence also fails.
Consequently, bank loans are crowded out, and this negatively affects investment
and capital accumulation. The ratio of the reduction in loans to the accumulated
reserves, which I define as crowding-out coefficient, is between zero and one.
This paper provides bank level evidence for the crowding out effect of reserve
accumulation. I investigate monthly balance sheets of all banks in Korea over the
massive reserve accumulation period(September 2003 to August 2008). First, I
find that bank loans to private firms declined after reserve accumulation. The
crowding-out coefficient is estimated to be 0.5. Second, I examine whether reserve
accumulation leads banks to cut loans by exploiting two factors that would make
some banks more responsive than others. I find that stronger banks, namely larger,
more capitalized banks with abundant core deposits, reduce loans more after reserve
accumulation. They can be more responsive in cutting loans and lending to the
central bank because they can expand lending easily again later. This is consistent
with another finding, that foreign bank branches are much more responsive to reserve
accumulation than domestic banks. The main business of those branches is not in
making loans but in trading securities. They are eager to cut loans when more
profitable sterilization securities are supplied.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 overviews re-
lated literature and documents the contributions of this paper. Section 1.3 provides
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the analytical model that describes the domestic consequences of reserve accumu-
lation, including reduction in bank loans. Section 1.4 investigates the data and
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Existing models of reserve accumulation describe reserves as being accumu-
lated by lump-sum taxation or by a representative agent’s voluntary saving. Exam-
ples include Caballero and Panageas (2005), Durdu et al. (2009), Alfaro and Kanczuk
(2009), Jeanne and Ranciere (2011), Jeanne (2012), Benigno and Fornaro (2012),
and Bacchetta et al. (2013). Reserve accumulation has limited effects on domestic
financial market in these models as the reserve accumulation is not central bank’s
borrowing. There are some FX intervention models that describe intervention as
being executed by central bank’s borrowing. However, they do not have competing
private borrowers. See Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), Amador et al. (2016). By con-
struction, they fail to observe the effect of reserve accumulation on other borrowers
in the economy. I develop a reserve accumulation model which has private borrowers
and reserves are accumulated by central bank’s borrowing. Using the model, I show
analytically that bank loans, investment, and capital are crowded out after reserve
accumulation.
This paper adds to the literature on the cost of reserves. This literature is
mainly focused on direct sterilization costs or the carry cost of reserves. They
estimate the spread of sterilization bonds over the interest earned from reserves.
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Examples are Calvo (1991), Calvo et al. (2012), Rodrik (2006), Lavigne (2008), and
Adler and Mano (2016). Calvo (1991) investigates this cost and warns of the “perils”
of sterilized intervention. Calvo et al. (2012) also weigh the cost of reserves using this
measure. Rodrik (2006) suggests a similar but different definition of reserve cost.
He argues that the “social cost” of reserves should be calculated from the spread
between the yield on reserves and the cost of foreign borrowing, since reserves could
have been used to reduce the country’s external debts.
More closely related to this paper are Reinhart et al. (2016) and Cook and
Yetman (2012). Reinhart et al. (2016) relate the decline of growth in Asia after
2000 with reserve accumulation and bring up the possibility that private sector
investments have been crowded out by reserve accumulation. Their argument is
supported by correlations of macro aggregates and VAR evidence. Cook and Yetman
(2012) compare 2003 and 2007 balance sheets of 55 banks in Asia and find that a
1% increase in reserves is associated with a 1.3% decline in loan growth. My paper
contributes to the literature on cost of reserves by investigating the negative effect
of reserve accumulation on bank lending and the role of bank heterogeneity.
This paper is also related to the burgeoning literature on bank lending behav-
ior. Bank lending has been an important interest of many researchers since it can
affect resource allocation, productivity and growth. Many factors that can affect
bank lending have been examined by the literature. Buch and Goldberg (2014)
study how liquidity risk affects bank lending in different countries. Baskaya et al.
(2017) show that capital inflows lead to bank loan expansion in Turkey. Jiménez
et al. (2014) find that expansionary monetary policy induces lowly capitalized banks
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to provide more loans to risky firms. Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2016) find effects
of U.S. quantitative easing on bank lending. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) identify
banks which cut lending more than others during the Great Recession, exploiting
cross-sectional differences in bank characteristics. The contribution of my work to
this literature is that I investigate a previously unstudied shock, reserve accumula-
tion with a new dataset from Korea.
1.3 The Model
I study a two period (t = 1, 2) small open economy model. The economy is
inhabited by households, firms and banks, each with a unit measure. There is a
central bank which accumulates foreign exchange reserves. In general, the need for
FX reserves would arise from precaution against sudden stops, or from the desire of
achieving a trade surplus. I do not provide a particular justification in this paper, al-
though the model shows trade balance improvement through reserve accumulation.
Instead, I take central bank intervention as given and focus on its effects on firms,
bank loans and production. In addition, there is a continuum of foreign investors
channelling international capital flows.
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1.3.1 Households
A continuum of identical households consume two goods, home goods and
foreign goods. Home goods are the numeraire in this economy, and are produced
by domestic firms, while foreign goods are the numeraire outside this economy, and
are imported. I abuse the word currency to mean a claim to the numeraire of the
economy hereafter. The exchange rate et is defined as the price of a unit of foreign
good in units of home goods at time t. An increase in et is therefore depreciation
as usual. The households’ problem is:
max lnC1 + β lnC2
s.t. Ct ≡ CχH,tC
1−χ
F,t
CH,1 + e1CF,1 = πB,1 (1.1)
CH,2 + e2CF,2 = πB,2 + πF − τ (1.2)
χ governs the household preference over home goods and foreign goods, and is
between zero and one. Households own banks and firms and earn profits πB,t, πF ,
respectively. τ is a tax levied by the central bank, which will be explained later.
The households’ problem is stylized as I strive to focus on transactions between
banks and firms. The households do not participate in the domestic financial market
directly. Instead, they smooth consumption through their ownership of banks.3 The
only decision of the households is on the consumption ratio between home goods
3This feature is also present in Benigno and Fornaro (2012).
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In the optimum, the marginal utility per one unit of domestic currency spending is
the same in both home good and foreign good consumption, and equals λt.
To clear the home goods market, I need to introduce a demand curve of the
rest of the world (RoW). From Equation (1.3), we see that the households devote a
fraction (1 − χ) of total expenditure Et to foreign goods (etCF,t = (1 − χ)Et). By




C∗H,t = (1− χ)E∗t
By normalizing E∗t = (1 − χ)−1, I make foreign demand for home goods the same
as the exchange rate.
C∗H,t = et (1.4)
1.3.2 Firms




A representative firm enters the first period with initial capital K1 and existing
debt L1 owed to the banks. It is assumed that the initial debt is same as the first
period output (L1 = zK1), so the firm produces with initial capital and uses the
entire output to pay back the initial debt. The firm can get loan L2 from the banks
and uses it to invest in K2. Capital does not depreciate. Investment is done using
home goods and is irreversible.4 The firm yields profit to the households only in the
terminal period. Consequently, the firms’ problem is as follows:
max πF = zK2 −RL2 (1.5)
s.t. K2 = K1 + L2 (1.6)
The borrowing rate in this economy is R and the capital rate of return is z.
The solution to firms’ problem shows that R and z should be equal to each other in
any equilibrium.
R = z (1.7)
For simplicity and analytical results, I further assume here the following.
βz = 1
Therefore, the capital rate of return z is β−1. This assumption is harmless for the
purpose of this model, because household consumption smoothing is not the focus.
4If investment is done by foreign goods (or more generally, some combination of foreign goods
and home goods), reserve accumulation will crowd out bank loans even more because it will make
investment more expensive. I close this channel by assuming investment is done only using home
goods, and focus on the crowding out of loans due to imperfect international capital flows.
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1.3.3 Banks
A representative bank yields profit to the households in both periods. Essen-
tially, it does consumption smoothing on behalf of the households. It can also issue
bonds to the foreign investors. The bank’s problem is:




s.t. L1 +B = πB,1 + L2 + S (1.8)
RL2 +RS = πB,2 +RB (1.9)
λt is the households’ marginal utility at time t. B is banks’ bond issuance which will
be bought by foreign investors, and S is lending to the central bank. In the absence
of risk, all domestic liabilities are perfectly substitutable. Hence, all domestic bonds
in this model bear the same interest rate R. The banks’ first order condition is a
typical Euler equation.
λ1 = βRλ2 (1.10)
1.3.4 Foreign Investors
There is a growing literature on segmented international financial markets in
which foreign demand for home bonds is finitely elastic.5 I follow this literature to
bring uncovered interest rate parity failure into the model.
5For example, see Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), Fanelli and Straub (2016), and Amador et al.
(2016).
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There is a continuum of foreign investors. They start with no capital of their
own and trade bonds. A foreign investor’s balance sheet consists of q units of
domestic currency(home goods) and −q/e1 obligation in foreign currency(foreign
goods), where q is the domestic currency bonds in which the investor is long of
and −q/e1 is the corresponding valued bond in foreign currency. They borrow q/e1
from the foreign financial market in foreign currency at world interest rate R∗ and
exchange it with domestic currency in the SOE’s FX market.6 Then they lend q to
domestic banks at rate R. Hence the value of the foreign investor in terms of home






q = Ωq (1.11)
After taking positions, the foreign investor can divert a portion Γ| q
e1
| of the
funds it intermediates.7 If the foreign investor diverts the funds, it would get the
proceeds from diversion in period two, and the lenders to the foreign investor recover
a portion 1 − Γ| q
e1
| of their credit position | q
e1
|. Since lenders correctly anticipate
the investors’ incentives for diversion, the foreign investors are subject to a credit





∣∣∣∣ · ∣∣∣∣ qe1
∣∣∣∣ (1.12)
Since the value of the firm is linear in the position q, while the right hand side
6It is assumed that the exogenous world interest rate R∗ is smaller than the rate of return z of
this economy as we are analyzing private capital inflows.





q = Ω. Γ|
q
e1
| < 1 is always satisfied in an equilibrium if one makes a mild assumption that the
return rate of FX intermediation is less than 100%. (−1 < Ω < 1)
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of the constraint is convex in q, the constraint always binds. Substituting the value
into the constraint, and aggregating across the unit mass of foreign investors, the















In these expressions, the term in parenthesis is the deviation from the uncovered
interest rate parity condition. So the capital flow is linear in the deviation from UIP
and Γ is the parameter that governs the degree of openness of this economy. If Γ
is zero then international capital flows are frictionless and UIP holds. When Γ goes
to infinity, then there are no capital flows and the economy is in financial autarky.
In what follows, Γ is assumed to be a positive number and UIP fails in the model
economy.8
8In the absence of uncertainty, expected return is the same as realized return in this model.
Hence, UIP violation also means CIP violation. In the data, UIP does not hold but CIP does.
This is problematic to the literature of segmented international markets. As it is pointed out by
Amador et al. (2016), however, segmented market models predict that the CIP gap increases with
reserve accumulation, which is consistent with the data.
13
1.3.5 Central Bank
For reasons exogenous to the model, the central bank sets a target for foreign
exchange reserves of F measured in units of foreign currency. It cannot borrow
from foreigners (F ≥ 0), and the reserve accumulation cannot exceed total exports
which are equal to one in terms of foreign currency(F ≤ 1).9 It borrows S from the
domestic financial market, converts this to foreign currency in the FX market and
invests abroad.
For the sake of completeness, the central bank brings the return on reserves
back to the home country and pays back the domestic debt in period 2. Through
this operation the central bank may occur fiscal losses. It covers the loss by lump-
sum taxation on the households. The central bank budget constraints in each period
are:
S = e1F (1.14)
R∗e2F + τ = RS (1.15)
Equation (1.15) determines the amount of tax τ needed for a given reserve F .
9Reserves not exceeding total exports is a mild assumption. For instance, in the year 2007, the
Korean exports of goods were 382 billion USD while reserves outstanding at the end of the same
year were 262 billion USD.
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1.3.6 Equilibrium
There are four markets to be cleared in this economy. The market clearing
conditions are as below.
• Home goods market
CH,1 + C
∗
H,1 + (zK1 − L1 + L2) = zK1 (1.16)
CH,2 + C
∗





























The FX market clearing conditions are derived from combining budget con-
straints of each agent. These are the resource constraints of this economy.
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Equilibrium Definition
An equilibrium is defined as a set of allocations {CH,1, CF,1, CH,2, CF,2, C∗H,1, C∗H,2,
λ1, λ2, L2, K2, B,Q, S, τ, πF , πB,1, πB,2} and prices {e1, e2, R} that satisfies equations
(1.1)-(1.10), (1.13)-(1.17), and (1.19)-(1.21) given target FX reserve F , initial capi-
tal K1 and world interest rate R
∗.
Note that (1.3) and (1.4) constitute two equations each, so the number of unknowns
matches the number of equations.
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
The equations that define the equilibrium are linear in endogenous variables. The
coefficient matrix of the equation system is non-singular and a unique equilibrium
exists. Formal proof is provided in Appendix A.
1.3.7 Effect of Reserve Accumulation
I describe the domestic consequence of reserve accumulation with the following
five propositions. They characterize the effect of reserve accumulation on capital
flows, bank loans, the exchange rate, the trade balance, and consumption. The
analysis is focused on the first period. The propositions are derived from the model’s
closed form solution. Proofs are provided in Appendix A.
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Proposition 1. (Ricardian equivalence failure) Private capital inflows only par-





The numerator is private capital inflows and the denominator is public outflows,
both measured in foreign currency. As the central bank channels funds abroad, the
banks are short of funds to make loans and borrow more from abroad. Because
of the friction in international capital flows, however, the additional borrowing is
smaller than the funding shortage caused by reserve accumulation.
The model captures the two-way capital flows of private inflows and public
outflows. The model is consistent with the empirical finding of Alfaro et al. (2014)
that private capital inflows are obscured by large public outflows in reserve accu-
mulating countries.
Proposition 2. (Loan crowding-out) Banks cut loans to firms when the central




Thus, reserve accumulation leads banks to cut loans to firms. Loans in this model
are used only for investment. Hence, this proposition can also be read as ‘Reserve
accumulation crowds out capital accumulation.’ The following corollary compares
the size of reduced loans with accumulated reserves.
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1 + ( z−1Γ + F )R
∗
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−R∗(1 + z)F 2 + (R∗χ (χ+ z)−
1






The crowding-out coefficient is defined as the ratio of reduced loans to accumulated
reserves. Using the period one ex-post exchange rate, the model crowding-out coef-
ficient is derived as above. Numerical examples in the appendix illustrate that this
coefficient is between zero and one. In the Section 4, this coefficient is empirically
estimated to be 0.48 for Korea.




As in Kumhof (2010) and Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), sterilized intervention can
affect the exchange rate because domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substi-
tutes. Through reserve accumulation, the central bank supplies domestic currency,
demanding foreign currency. The private sector cannot undo the central bank action
perfectly. As a result, the exchange rate depreciates.
The exchange rate is the same as exports in this model, hence this proposition
also says that exports increase after reserve accumulation.
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Proposition 4. (Consumption crowding-out) Consumption of both home goods and







Like other models of reserve accumulation, this model exhibits consumption crowd-
ing out for home goods and foreign goods as reserve accumulation is akin to forced
saving to the households.




Exports increase and imports decrease with more reserves being accumulated. As
a result, the trade balance in period 1 improves. This might imply a mercantilist
motivation for reserve accumulation if there is a dynamic benefit from running a
trade surplus. This motivation is not discussed in this paper.
The propositions summarize the effect of reserve accumulation on the econ-
omy and show the mechanism. These propositions can be illustrated by numerical
examples. I solve the model numerically and provide examples in the Appendix.
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1.4 Empirical Investigation
In this section, I examine the impact of reserve accumulation on bank lending
using bank level data from Korea. First, I show that bank loans fell after reserve
accumulation in Korea over the massive reserve accumulation period of September
2003 to August 2008. Second, I investigate whether reserve accumulation leads
banks to cut loans by exploiting cross-sectional differences of bank lending after
reserve accumulation.
1.4.1 Data
The data used for the analysis in this paper come from the Bank of Ko-
rea(BOK). BOK collects detailed bank balance sheets every month from every bank
which operates in Korea. This data contributes to monetary policy implementation
and is also used for compilation of the official monetary and financial statistics.
The data is more detailed than the publicly available quarterly financial statements
of banks. It includes many items that are not on the public financial statements.
For example, it reports loans to different types of debtors and securities in several
categories.
The data encompass all banks that operate in Korea. There are 20 domestic
banks and 47 foreign bank branches throughout the sample period of September
2003 to August 2008. As shown in Table 1.1, foreign bank branches are very differ-
ent from domestic banks in size and asset composition. Foreign bank branches are
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tiny in total assets size. Sum of 47 foreign bank branches’ total assets is roughly one
tenth of that of 20 domestic banks. 26.9% of the branches’ total assets are invested
in safe public bonds, while 5.4% are loans to private firms. This is in contrast with
domestic banks. 30.3% of domestic banks assets are loans and only 7.1% are safe
bonds.
Table 1.1: Bank Asset Composition
N Loans to Gov’t, central Corporate Total
private firms bank bonds bonds assets
Domestic banks 20 326.8 77.0 50.2 1077.5
(30.3) (7.1) (4.7) (100.0)
Foreign bank branches 47 6.2 30.8 0.8 114.6
(5.4) (26.9) (0.7) (100.0)
Top 5 branches 5 3.1 3.8 0.4 27.1
(11.5) (14.0) (1.6) (100.0)
Notes: The numbers are monthly average of sum across bank groups. Values are in 2003.9
real KRW. Numbers in parentheses are composition ratios. Loans cover only loans to private
firms. Public bonds are government bonds and central bank bonds.
I construct two panels A and B to compare different banks. I exclude foreign
bank branches from Panel A and study only regular domestic banks, and construct
Panel B to include large foreign bank branches and compare their behavior with
domestic banks. In particular, Panel A consists of the 20 regular domestic banks.
The sample of banks varies from 17 to 19 throughout the period due to entry and
exit. 15 banks have continuously been operating over the period. Panel B consists of
the 20 banks in panel A plus 5 foreign bank branches whose average loans are larger
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than 500 billion KRW (roughly 0.5 billion USD). I include only top five foreign bank
branches in the sample, because other smaller branches are not making meaningful
amount of loans. Summary statistics of key variables from both Panel A and Panel
B are provided in the Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Mean SD P25 P50 P75
Panel A: 20 domestic banks
Total assets(tril. KRW) 62.58 52.72 16.39 54.08 98.40
Log total assets 17.41 1.23 16.61 17.81 18.40
Loans to private firms(tril.KRW) 18.98 16.70 5.93 11.04 34.14
∆ ln loans 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
Core deposit ratio 0.53 0.18 0.46 0.57 0.65
Capital ratio 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07
Panel B: Panel A + 5 branches
Total assets(tril. KRW) 51.70 52.31 9.20 22.16 85.53
Log total assets 17.02 1.39 16.03 16.91 18.26
Loans to private firms(tril.KRW) 15.44 16.64 1.65 7.53 22.22
∆ ln loans 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.02
Core deposit ratio 0.45 0.24 0.25 0.51 0.63
Capital ratio 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07
Notes: P25, P50 and P75 refer to 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, respectively.
The main dependent variable in this study is bank loans. The data distin-
guish loans with different types of debtors and different currencies. I consider loans
to private firms only and include both Korean Won loans and FX loans in the main
variable Loansb,m. b represents individual banks and m stands for month. All vari-
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ables are deflated using September 2003 as the base month for inflation adjustment.
The top and bottom 0.5% of loans and total assets are winsorized to reduce the
impact of possible outliers.
1.4.2 Sample Period
The baseline analysis focuses on the five years from September 2003 to August
2008. Korea accumulated a large stock of reserves between the 1997 Asian Crisis
and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. After being bailed out by the IMF in 1997,
Korea accumulated 242 billion USD over the next 10 years. By the end of 2007, the
FX reserve stock reached 262 billion USD, which amounts to 23.4% of its GDP the
same year.









2002/09 2003/09 2004/09 2005/09 2006/09 2007/09 2008/09
(billion USD)
Notes: The data is from the Bank of Korea. The sample period is from September 2003
to August 2008, while this graph shows the period from September 2002 to August 2009.
23
The sample period starts in September 2003 because the available data start
from there. On the other side, the Global Financial Crisis period is excluded from
the sample. Figure 1.2 shows the monthly reserve accumulation over the sample
period. During the crisis, Korea experienced huge reserve decumulation, which is
not of our interest. Over the sample period, Korea accumulated 92 billion USD
reserves. This is roughly a quarter of the current stock of FX reserves(371 billion
USD as of December 2016). Monthly average accumulation was 1.5 billion USD,
with a standard deviation of 2.7 billion USD. Data for the period after the Great
Recession is also available. However, this period involves more frequent decumula-
tion episodes due to the European crisis and other events, so it is not appropriate
for the analysis in this paper. Important macroeconomic statistics over the sample
period are provided in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Macro Aggregates over the Sample Period
Mean SD P25 P50 P75
Reserve accumulation(10 bil. USD) 0.15 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.23
Real GDP growth 1.2 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.7
Policy rate 4.1 0.6 3.5 4.0 4.5
Real exchange rate fluctuation -0.002 0.017 -0.013 -0.004 0.009
Notes: P25, P50 and P75 refer to 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, respectively.
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1.4.3 Bank Lending after Reserve Accumulation
I begin by examining the relationship between bank loans and reserve accu-
mulation. To control for other factors that can influence bank lending, I run panel
regressions with fixed effects and controls. The baseline regression equation is as
follows:
∆ ln Loansb,m = αb+αq +λm+βRAm−1 +γBankb,m−1 +θMacrom−1 + εb,m (1.22)
where αb is a bank fixed effect; αq is a quarter fixed effect; and m is a linear trend
variable. RA is Korea’s monthly transaction of FX reserves, as reported in the
balance of payments.
The baseline dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of a bank’s
loans. Different studies use different forms of the dependent variable in the literature.
The change in log loans is used in Jiménez et al. (2017). The log level of loans is
also popular: see Baskaya et al. (2017) and Jiménez et al. (2014). The ratio of the
change in loans to total assets is used in the International Banking Research Network
papers: see Buch and Goldberg (2014). I use the change in log loans form, although
the regression results are robust to use of other different forms of the dependent
variable.
When the dependent variable is in the change in log form, the bank fixed effect
controls for the different trends of loans for individual banks, whereas the bank fixed
effect absorbs different, time-invariant levels of loans across different banks when the
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regressand is the log level of loans. The change in log form combined with bank
fixed effects, assigns different trends of loan growth across banks, and absorbs more
variation in the regressand. Over the sample period, different banks had different
trend loan growth in the data, which is seemingly unrelated to reserve accumulation
because monthly reserve accumulation had no trend as can be seen from Figure 1.2.
As such, the change in log form is more suitable for this research.
In addition to the time and unit fixed effects, I include controls for individual
bank characteristics. Bank is a set of bank level control variables which are standard
in the literature. This includes banks’ log total assets, capital ratio and core deposit
ratio.
The timing and magnitude of reserve accumulation are decided by the central
bank, presumably as a function of macroeconomic variables. To control for other
macroeconomic factors that might affect bank loans, I include quarter fixed effects, a
linear time trend, and the vector Macro which includes inflation, the real policy rate
and the real exchange rate.10 The quarter fixed effects absorbs quarterly differences
in the loan growth rate, hence I use only the within quarter variation of loans.
The linear trend absorbs within quarter linear trends. RA and other independent
variables are lagged one month in order to mitigate endogeneity issues. All the
regressions are based on weighted least squares using bank size as weight. Standard
errors are clustered by banks.
Table 1.4 presents the results. Each column uses different forms of the depen-
10Regression results without real policy rate, real exchange rate are not very different from the
main regression results.
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dent variable. Column (1) uses the main form, the change in log loans. Results for
the log level of loans are shown in column (2). Column (3) uses the ratio of the
change in loans with respect to total assets. Regardless of how I define the change
in loans, the coefficient is negative and significant. For both Panel A and Panel
B, reserve accumulation is negatively associated with loan growth. The coefficients
are statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficients from Panel B are more
negative than those of Panel A in all three columns.
The coefficients are also economically significant. Over the sample period, the
standard deviation of monthly real reserve accumulation is 2.5 billion USD. Using
the coefficient from column (1) for Panel A, I calculate that 2.5 billion USD reserve
accumulation is associated with a decrease in the average loan growth rate of 0.40
percentage points. This is more than half of the average monthly loan growth rate
of 0.69%.
I then estimate the crowding-out coefficient, proposed in Corollary 1. It is
defined as the amount of reduction in loans after one dollar of reserve accumulation.
I apply the coefficient from column (1) Panel A to total loans of all domestic banks
and convert it to USD to compare with accumulated reserves:
−0.0161︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficient
× 301.7 trillion KRW︸ ︷︷ ︸
total loans to private firms∗
÷ 973 KRW/USD︸ ︷︷ ︸
real exchange rate∗
= −5.0 billion USD︸ ︷︷ ︸
decrease in loans after 10 biliion R.A.
* as of March 2006(center of the sample period)
For total loans and the real exchange rate, I use the data of March 2006, which is
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RAm−1 -0.0161*** -0.0174*** -0.469***
(0.0038) (0.0040) (0.1157)
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,013
Number of Banks 20 20 20
R-squared 0.241 0.847 0.220
Panel B
RAm−1 -0.0252*** -0.0225*** -0.567***
(0.0086) (0.0049) (0.1887)
Observations 1,257 1,257 1,257
Number of Banks 25 25 25
R-squared 0.067 0.727 0.062
Macro controls & trend yes yes yes
Bank controls yes yes yes
Quarter F.E. yes yes yes
Bank F.E. yes yes yes
Notes: The sample period is 2003.9-2008.8. RA is the reserve accumulation
measured in 10 billion USD in the balance of payments. Loans and total
assets are winsorized at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. A constant is included in
every regression but its coefficient is left unreported. Fixed effects and macro
controls are either included(yes), not included(no), or spanned by another set
of effects(-). Bank controls include log assets, core deposit ratio and capital
ratio. Macro controls include inflation, real policy rate, and the real exchange
rate. The coefficients for these controls are not reported. Regressions are
all weighted-least squares, where weights are equal to the bank asset size.
Standard errors are clustered by bank. ***, ** and * denote significance at
1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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the center of the sample period. The crowding-out coefficient is estimated as 0.5.
This means that bank loans decline by 50 cents after one extra dollar of reserve
accumulation.
1.4.4 Cross-sectional Differences in Bank Lending
In this section, I explore cross-sectional differences of the response of bank
lending to reserve accumulation to examine whether reserve accumulation leads
banks to cut loans. In particular, I investigate two characteristics that can make
some banks more responsive to reserve accumulation. First, I check whether large,
sound banks are different from other banks in response to reserve accumulation. It
would be easier for large and sound banks to cut loans and switch to assets offered
by the central bank after reserve accumulation, since they can expand loans more
easily later, compared to small and constrained banks.
Second, I check whether foreign bank branches are different in response to
reserve accumulation than other ordinary domestic banks. It is a well known fact
that foreign bank branches specialize in trading safe public securities on behalf of
mother banks abroad. Making loans is not the main business for foreign bank
branches although they do provide loans to firms. This can be confirmed from
comparison of their asset composition with that of domestic banks. As can be seen
from Table 1.1, 27% of foreign bank branches’ assets are invested in safe bonds,
while loans to firms account for only 5%. In contrast, loans to firms are 30% of
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assets and safe bonds cover only 7% for domestic banks. As such, one can expect
foreign bank branches to cut loans more aggressively than domestic banks when
more central bank securities are supplied in the market as a consequence of reserve
accumulation.
I investigate bank heterogeneity by interacting bank characteristics with re-
serve accumulation:
∆ ln Loansb,m = αb + αm + βRAm−1 ×Xb + γBankb,m−1 + εb,m (1.23)
Xb is a set of bank characteristics including asset size, capital ratio, core deposit
ratio, and a foreign bank branch dummy. These variables are averaged over the
sample period and interacted with reserve accumulation. The main regressor in
this specification varies over both banks and months, so I can use monthly fixed
effects(αm). When I use monthly fixed effects, the linear trend and macro controls
are not carried over from the previous specification.
Table 1.5 shows the results. Columns (1)-(2) are regressions on Panel A, and
(3)-(4) are regressions on Panel B. Note that columns (1) and (3) do not include
monthly fixed effects. Instead they have quarter fixed effects, macro controls and
linear trend. Column (2) and (4) have monthly fixed effects, so the regression
equation is exactly Equation (1.23). Column (1) includes the RA term directly
without having monthly fixed effects. The coefficient is similar to that of Table 1.4.
It shows that reserve accumulation is negatively associated with the loan growth
rate. Looking at the interaction terms in column (1), we see that larger banks,
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Table 1.5: Cross-sectional Determinants of Bank Lending
Panel A Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans)
RAm−1 -0.0157*** -0.0259***
(0.0036) (0.0078)
ln assetb × RAm−1 -0.00550*** -0.00541*** -0.00744*** -0.00724***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Core Deposit Ratiob × RAm−1 -0.0226** -0.0227* -0.0336** -0.0318**
(0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0139) (0.0135)
Capital Ratiob × RAm−1 -0.155** -0.162** -0.0989 -0.0925
(0.0620) (0.0637) (0.1133) (0.1125)
Foreign Bank Branchb × RAm−1 -0.0817*** -0.0796***
(0.0107) (0.0102)
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,257 1,257
Number of Banks 20 20 25 25
R-squared 0.250 0.372 0.076 0.114
Macro controls & trend yes - yes -
Bank controls yes yes yes yes
Quarter F.E. yes - yes -
Month F.E. no yes no yes
Bank F.E. yes yes yes yes
Notes: The sample period is 2003.9-2008.8. RA is the reserve accumulation measured in 10
billion USD in the balance of payments. Loans and total assets are winsorized at the 0.5 and
99.5 percentiles. All interaction terms are demeaned. A constant is included in every regression
but its coefficient is left unreported. Fixed effects and macro controls are either included(yes),
not included(no), or spanned by another set of effects(-). Bank controls include log assets, core
deposit ratio and capital ratio. Macro controls include inflation, real policy rate and the real
exchange rate. The coefficients for these controls are not reported. Regressions are all weighted-
least squares, where weights are equal to the bank asset size. Standard errors are clustered by
bank. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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banks with abundant core deposits, and more capitalized banks reduce loans more
after reserve accumulation. This result remains valid in column (2), where I absorb
time series variation using monthly fixed effects.
Regressions on Panel B suggest similar results. The absolute value of coeffi-
cients become larger compared to the regressions on Panel A, and the interaction
term with the capital ratio loses statistical significance in Panel B. An important
result is that the coefficient on the interaction of RA with the foreign bank branch
dummy is negative and significant. Column (3) suggests that foreign bank branches
cut loans roughly four times more than domestic banks after reserve accumulation.
This result remains valid in column (4), where monthly fixed effects are included.
The economic significance of bank heterogeneity can be checked by examining
the differences in responses of banks with interquartile differences in each character-
istic. From column (2) of Table 1.5, after a 2.5 billion USD reserve accumulation,
the loan growth rate declines 0.22 percentage points more in a bank at the 75th
percentile of assets compared to a bank at the 25th percentile of assets. The loan
growth rate declines 0.10 percentage points more in a bank with a 75th percentile
core deposit ratio compared to a bank at the 25th percentile. The loan growth rate
declines 0.08 percentage points more in a bank with a 75th percentile capital ratio
compared to a bank with a 25th percentile capital ratio. In addition, column (4)
suggests that foreign bank branches reduce loans 2.0 percentage points more than
domestic banks after reserve accumulation of 2.5 billion USD.
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1.4.5 Robustness Check
The regression results are robust to various changes. I report additional results
in the following tables. First, Table 1.6 presents results using different forms of
the dependent variable and different sample periods. Columns (1) and (2) use the
change in loans normalized by bank assets as the dependent variable. The results are
similar with the benchmark results in Table 1.5. Columns (3) and (4) show results
for a different sample period. Since reserve decumulation over the Great Recession
started as early as January 2008, the regressions in columns (3) and (4) exclude
2008 observations. The absolute value of coefficients get larger while statistical
significance is not affected.
Table 1.7 presents results using only local currency loans. In the benchmark
regressions, the dependent variable bank loans includes both FX loans and KRW
loans. In terms of quantity, FX loans and KRW loans are roughly in the ratio of
1 to 9. The regressions in Table 1.7 exclude FX loans, but are not substantially
different from the benchmark results.
Table 1.8 shows results with different bank categories. Columns (1) and
(2) shows result with the primary dealer dummy. Each year, the bank of Ko-
rea announces a group of financial intermediaries which can participate in the pri-
mary market of sterilization securities. The selection is mainly based on soundness
and past security transaction records of the intermediaries. The dummy variable
Primary Dealorb equals one if the bank was a primary dealer for at least four years
within the five years of the sample period. The results show that primary dealer
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banks cut loans more than other banks. The coefficient on the interaction term,
however, lose its statistical significance once bank size, capital ratio, and core de-
posit ratio interaction terms are included together.
In columns (3) and (4), I use a dummy variable for nationwide banks. The
20 domestic banks can be categorized into 14 nationwide banks and 6 local banks.
In general, nationwide banks are larger in asset size than local banks. Columns (3)
and (4) compare the impact of reserve accumulation across three different groups
of banks: nationwide banks, local banks and foreign bank branches. The base
group is local banks. The coefficient on reserve accumulation is -0.0241 for the
local bank group, -0.0341 for the nationwide bank group and -0.0796 for foreign
bank branches. All those coefficients are statistically significant. Thus, the results
show that nationwide banks reduce loans more than local banks after reserve ac-
cumulation. Foreign bank branches reduce loan even more than nationwide banks.
However, the coefficient on the interaction term of nationwide dummy and RA lose
statistical significance once the other interaction terms with bank size, capital ra-
tio and core deposit ratio are included. The coefficient on the interaction of foreign
bank branches dummy and RA stays significant after including the other interaction
terms as previously reported in Table 1.5.
Table 1.9 provides results using the log rather than the level of reserve accu-
mulation. To avoid negative values, the monthly reserve accumulation is re-scaled
by adding 10 billion USD to every observation. By taking logs, the possible effect of
outliers in the main independent variable is reduced. The regression results are sim-
ilar to the benchmark results, except that the interpretation of the main coefficient
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is now an elasticity.
Finally, Table 1.10 presents results from a placebo test. The goal of reserve
accumulation is often thought to be exchange rate manipulation. One might worry
that it is the change in the exchange rate that causes the change in bank loans,
as the debtor firms are affected by exchange rate fluctuation. As a placebo test, I
replace reserve accumulation with the growth rate of the exchange rate. I do not
find any significant results from this regression.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates an opportunity cost of FX reserve accumulation: re-
duction in bank loans to private firms. A simple FX intervention model shows that
bank loans are crowded out by reserve accumulation. The reduction in loans leads
to falls in investment and the capital stock. Empirical evidence from bank balance
sheets suggests that bank loans are reduced after reserve accumulation. Particularly,
the effect is larger in stronger banks and foreign bank branches.
This paper provides an important policy implication on how sterilized reserve
accumulation can help open economies deal with large capital inflows and currency
appreciation. There is a view that capital inflows lead to asset price inflation and
credit increases. Policy makers believe that capital inflows are expansionary. This
is supported by empirical evidences in the literature. For example, Baskaya et al.
(2017) show that capital inflows decrease the cost of borrowing and lead to credit
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expansion. The evidence presented in this paper shows that sterilized reserve accu-
mulation has contractionary effects by reducing loans and leverage. Reserve accumu-
lation not only works against exchange rate appreciation, but also partially offsets
the expansionary effect of capital inflows. This paper explains why foreign exchange
intervention is a favored tool to cope with capital inflows in many countries.
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Table 1.6: Different Regressand Form and Sample Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆loans/assets ∆loans/assets ∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans)
RAm−1 -0.460*** -0.0205***
(0.1138) (0.0060)
ln assetb × RAm−1 -0.142*** -0.139*** -0.00790*** -0.00759***
(0.0391) (0.0395) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Core Deposit Ratiob × RAm−1 -0.684** -0.684** -0.0387** -0.0361**
(0.2816) (0.2893) (0.0160) (0.0165)
Capital Ratiob × RAm−1 -4.494** -4.737** 0.199 0.205
(1.7698) (1.8236) (0.1749) (0.1766)
Foreign Bank Branchb × RAm−1 -0.0883*** -0.0856***
(0.0127) (0.0128)
Sample Period 03.9-08.8 03.9-08.8 03.9-07.12 03.9-07.12
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,087 1,089
Number of Banks 20 20 25 25
R-squared 0.226 0.350 0.080 0.119
Macro controls & trend yes - yes -
Bank controls yes yes yes yes
Quarter F.E. yes - yes -
Month F.E. no yes no yes
Bank F.E. yes yes yes yes
Notes: The sample periods are 2003.9-2008.8. in columns (1)-(2) and 2003.9-2007.12 in
columns (3)-(4). Columns (1)-(2) are on panel A, and (3)-(4) are on panel B. RA is the reserve
accumulation measured in 10 billion USD in the balance of payments. Dependent variables in
columns (1)-(2) are multiplied by 100. Loans and total assets are winsorized at the 0.5 and
99.5 percentiles. All interaction terms are demeaned. A constant is included in every regression
but its coefficient is left unreported. Fixed effects and macro controls are either included(yes),
not included(no), or spanned by another set of effects(-). Bank controls include log assets, core
deposit ratio and capital ratio. Macro controls include inflation, real policy rate and the real
exchange rate. The coefficients for these controls are not reported. Regressions are weighted-
least squares, where weights are equal to the bank asset size. Standard errors are clustered by
bank. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
37
Table 1.7: KRW Loans
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln(KRW loans) ∆ ln(KRW loans) ∆ ln(KRW loans)
RAm−1 -0.0135*** -0.0131***
(0.0039) (0.0036)
ln assetb × RAm−1 -0.00586*** -0.00573***
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Core Deposit Ratiob × RAm−1 -0.0263** -0.0263**
(0.0110) (0.0115)
Capital Ratiob × RAm−1 -0.202*** -0.212***
(0.0696) (0.0718)
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,013
Number of Banks 20 20 20
R-squared 0.240 0.249 0.365
Macro controls & trend yes yes -
Bank controls yes yes yes
Quarter F.E. yes yes -
Month F.E. no no yes
Bank F.E. yes yes yes
Notes: Regressions are on Panel A. RA is the reserve accumulation measured in 10 billion
USD in the balance of payments. Loans and total assets are winsorized at the 0.5 and
99.5 percentiles. All interaction terms are demeaned. A constant is included in every
regression but its coefficient is left unreported. Fixed effects and macro controls are either
included(yes), not included(no), or spanned by another set of effects(-). Bank controls
include log assets, core deposit ratio and capital ratio. Macro controls include inflation,
real policy rate and the real exchange rate. The coefficients for these controls are not
reported. Regressions are weighted-least squares, where weights are equal to the bank asset
size. Standard errors are clustered by bank. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%,
10%, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Different Bank Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans)
RAm−1 -0.0154*** -0.0260***
(0.0036) (0.0074)
Primary Dealerb × RAm−1 -0.0123** -0.0121**
(0.0044) (0.0045)
Foreign Bank Branchb × RAm−1 -0.0552*** -0.0543***
(0.0054) (0.0052)
Nationwide Bankb × RAm−1 -0.00989** -0.0101**
(0.0041) (0.0040)
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,257 1,257
Number of Banks 20 20 25 25
R-squared 0.248 0.370 0.075 0.113
Macro controls & trend yes - yes -
Bank controls yes yes yes yes
Quarter F.E. yes - yes -
Month F.E. no yes no yes
Bank F.E. yes yes yes yes
Notes: Columns(1)-(2) are on Panel A and columns (3) and (4) are on Panel B. RA
is the reserve accumulation measured in 10 billion USD in the balance of payments.
Loans and total assets are winsorized at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. All interaction
terms are demeaned. A constant is included in every regression but its coefficient is left
unreported. Fixed effects and macro controls are either included(yes), not included(no),
or spanned by another set of effects(-). Bank controls include log assets, core deposit
ratio and capital ratio. Macro controls include inflation, real policy rate and the real
exchange rate. The coefficients for these controls are not reported. Regressions are
weighted-least squares, where weights are equal to the bank asset size. Standard errors
are clustered by bank. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.9: Elasticity Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans)
ln RAm−1 -0.0285** -0.0292**
(0.0127) (0.0110)
ln assetb × ln RAm−1 -0.00483*** -0.00468***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Core Deposit Ratiob × ln RAm−1 -0.0162* -0.0151*
(0.0083) (0.0079)
Capital Ratiob × ln RAm−1 -0.0940 -0.0921
(0.0844) (0.0834)
Foreign Bank Branchb × ln RAm−1 -0.0672*** -0.0658***
(0.0090) (0.0089)
Observations 1,257 1,257 1,257
Number of Banks 25 25 25
R-squared 0.070 0.078 0.114
Macro controls & trend yes yes -
Bank controls yes yes yes
Quarter F.E. yes yes -
Month F.E. no no yes
Bank F.E. yes yes yes
Notes: The sample period is 2003.9-2008.8. Regressions are on panel B. RA is the
reserve accumulation measured in 10 billion USD in the balance of payments. It
is rescaled by adding 10 billion USD to every observation for log transformation.
Loans and total assets are winsorized at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. A constant is
included in every regression but its coefficient is left unreported. Fixed effects and
macro controls are either included(yes), not included(no), or spanned by another
set of effects(-). Bank controls include log assets, core deposit ratio and capital
ratio. Macro controls include inflation, real policy rate and the real exchange rate.
The coefficients for these controls are not reported. Regressions are weighted by
the bank asset size. Standard errors are clustered by bank. ***, ** and * denote
significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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Table 1.10: Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans) ∆ ln(loans)
∆ ln ERm−1 0.0773 0.0818
(0.0856) (0.0909)
ln assetb ×∆ ln ERm−1 0.0157 0.0155
(0.0335) (0.0341)
Core Deposit Ratiob ×∆ ln ERm−1 -0.0977 -0.102
(0.3163) (0.3272)
Capital Ratiob ×∆ ln ERm−1 0.697 0.656
(1.5388) (1.5885)
Foreign Bank Branchb ×∆ ln ERm−1 0.262 0.252
(0.2724) (0.2659)
Observations 1,255 1,255 1,255
Number of Banks 25 25 25
R-squared 0.061 0.062 0.106
Macro controls & trend yes yes -
Bank controls yes yes yes
Quarter F.E. yes yes -
Month F.E. no no yes
Bank F.E. yes yes yes
Notes: The sample period is 2003.9-2008.8. Regressions are on panel B. Loans and
total assets are winsorized at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. ER is the KRW/USD
exchange rate. All interaction terms are demeaned. A constant is included in every
regression but its coefficient is left unreported. Fixed effects and macro controls
are either included(yes), not included(no), or spanned by another set of effects(-).
Bank controls include log assets, core deposit ratio and capital ratio. Macro controls
include inflation, real policy rate and the real exchange rate. The coefficients for
these controls are not reported. Regressions are weighted by the bank asset size.
Standard errors are clustered by bank. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%,
10%, respectively.
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Chapter 2: Reserve Accumulation and Firm Investment
2.1 Introduction
Since the takeoff of foreign reserve hoarding in Asia in the early 2000s, reserve
flows have received a substantial amount of attention. Unlike private flows, the size
and pace of reserve accumulation is determined by official institutions like central
banks. Many studies focus on the intentions of those institutions. However, possible
costs associated with reserve accumulation have not been as thoroughly investigated.
This paper analyzes the impact of reserve accumulation on domestic investment,
which has often been ignored in the literature.
From a practical point of view, foreign exchange reserves are funded by central
banks’ domestic borrowing. It is well documented in the literature that reserve
purchases are almost fully sterilized in most reserve accumulating countries.1 Table
2.1 provides a stylized central bank balance sheet. Sterilization is offsetting an
increase in net foreign assets by increasing liability items other than currency. Most
of the heavy reserve accumulating countries rely heavily on issuance of their own
securities, which are mostly held by domestic residents. Reserve requirements also
1Lavigne (2008) reports that emerging Asian countries sterilized most of their reserve accu-
mulation over 2000 to 2006. (Sterilization coefficients: China 0.80, Korea 0.99, Singapore 0.96,
Malaysia 0.96) See also Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), Aizenman and Glick (2009), Mohanty and
Turner (2006).
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play an important role by absorbing liquidity into reserve deposits. In essence, both
instruments are central banks’ domestic borrowing.
Table 2.1: Central Bank Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
· Net foreign assets · Currency
· Net domestic assets · Reserve deposits
· Central bank securities
· Equity
If reserves are funded by the central bank’s domestic borrowing, then reserve
accumulation should have implications for domestic financial markets. Central bank
borrowing reduces the remaining loanable funds available for other borrowers, espe-
cially firms. It is possible that reserve accumulation has unintended adverse conse-
quences on investment. Figure 2.1 shows international reserves and investment of
four East Asian countries from 1990 to 2014. The figure plots gross fixed capital
formation relative to GDP(left axis) against the reserve stock(right axis). As can
be seen from the graphs, theses countries are heavy reserve accumulators. In these
countries, a downtrend of investment coincides with reserve accumulation, as seen
by the highly negative correlations. It is true that the 1997 Asian financial crisis
affected both reserves and investment. However, investment remained depressed
even 15 years after the crisis, while reserve hoarding continued.
To better identify the crowding out effect of reserve accumulation, I focus
on firm heterogeneity. The financial sector should respond to larger central bank
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Notes: The data is from the IMF IFS. The red lines are the gross fixed capital formation
to GDP ratio, and they use left axis. The blue dotted lines show the stock of international
reserves(right axis).
borrowing by optimally adjusting their portfolio given the risk-return characteristics
of assets they hold. Therefore, sterilized reserve accumulation could impact large
and small firms differently. Central bank securities are more substitutable with large
firms’ low-risk, low-return debt securities than small firms’ high-risk, high-return
debt. After reserve accumulation, financial intermediaries’ portfolios are tilted more
toward risk-free, low-return central bank securities. This gives the intermediaries
more incentive to seek additional yield by taking more risk. If the intermediaries
reduce private credit supply to hold more central bank debt, they could reduce
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lending to large firms more than lending to small firms. I incorporate this mechanism
of differential effects of reserve accumulation on different-sized firms in a theoretical
model and find evidence from firm level data.
Figure 2.2 presents evidence on Korean commercial banks’ asset allocation
over the reserve accumulation period 1996-2007. The top left graph shows the
proportion of sterilization bonds in banks’ total assets, along with the reserve-GDP
ratio. The proportion of sterilization bonds in bank assets increases significantly as
reserves are accumulated. The next two graphs show banks’ loans to large firms
and loans to SMEs in proportion to total assets. The proportion of loans to large
firms is negatively correlated with the proportion of sterilization bonds, while the
proportion of loans to SMEs is positively correlated. The bottom-right graph shows
banks’ corporate bond holdings over total assets. Large firms have an ability to issue
and sell their own bonds while SMEs mostly rely on bank loans for their external
financing. The vast majority of corporate bonds are issued by large firms. The last
graph shows that bond holdings are also negatively correlated with banks’ holdings
of sterilization bonds.
Nevertheless, the existing literature on costs of reserves is mainly focused on
direct sterilization costs or the carry costs, meaning the spread of sterilization bonds
over the interest earned from reserves. Calvo (1991) first identifies this cost and
warns about the sustainability of sterilized intervention. In their study of the optimal
level of reserves, Calvo et al. (2012) weigh the cost of reserves using this measure.
Rodrik (2006) suggests a similar definition of reserve costs. He calculates the spread
between the return on reserves and the cost of the country’s foreign borrowing.
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Figure 2.2: Bank Credit Allocation
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Notes: The data is sourced from Korea Financial Supervisory Service. The graph shows the
sum of all commercial banks, excluding regional banks and government owned banks. The
dotted lines show the sterilization bond to total assets ratio in all four panels. The solid lines
in each panel show different asset items as indicated at the left axes.
Other possible costs discussed in the literature include negative externalities to
neighboring countries and investment crowding out. Aizenman and Lee (2008) argue
that reserve accumulation may trigger competitive hoarding in neighboring countries
(a keeping up with the Joneses effect). This yields negative externalities which can
pre-empt any gains from devaluation made by reserve hoarding. Reinhart et al.
(2016) relate the decline of growth rates in Asia after 2000 with reserve accumulation,
and raise the possibility that private sector investments have been crowded out by
international reserve accumulation. To the best of my knowledge, Reinhart et al.
(2016) is the first paper solely devoted to the relationship between reserves and
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investment. Their argument is supported by VAR evidence and correlations of
aggregate statistics. In contrast, I build a small open economy model and provide
micro evidence from Korean firms in this paper.
Existing models of international reserves fail to link reserve hoarding with
investment. Focusing on the benefits and motivations of reserve accumulation, they
often abstract from production and analyse endowment economies. Some models
with production do not have capital(and thus investment), which will be pinned
down by the world interest rate. Examples include Caballero and Panageas (2005),
Durdu et al. (2009), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009), Jeanne and Ranciere (2011), and
Benigno and Fornaro (2012). By construction, these papers do not find any effect of
reserve accumulation on capital or investment. In most of these models, the cost of
reserves is just the foregone consumption from saving today. Interestingly, many of
these studies document consumption crowding out. It is clear, however, that these
models would also have investment crowding out if they had capital and production
in their model.
My reading of the reserve accumulation literature leads me to focus on two
things in this paper: First, I develop a reserve accumulation model that includes
capital and investment. The model demonstrates how reserve accumulation crowds
out investment and how it affects large firms more than small firms. Second, I find
firm level evidence that supports the model implications. This paper tracks the
financial condition of 23,365 Korean firms from 2000 to 2007, using cash sensitivity
of investment as a proxy for financial constraints. I find that large firms become
23.8% more constrained after reserve accumulation increases by 1% of GDP, whereas
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small firms are not affected. The large firms’ investment loss amounts to 0.5% of
GDP per every one percent of GDP reserve accumulation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 builds a two
period small open economy model and shows the differential crowding out effects
of reserve accumulation on different sized firms. Section 2.3 provides supporting
evidence from Korean firm data. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Approach
This section builds a two period model of reserve accumulation. I model
reserve accumulation as a central bank borrowing domestically and saving abroad.
The benefits and motivations of the central bank for reserve accumulation are beyond
the scope of this paper. Instead, I focus on the domestic financial consequences of
reserve accumulation. Taking reserve accumulation as exogenously decided from
outside the model, I observe what happens to capital and investment of different-
sized firms.
There is a small open economy with two sectors, NT(non-tradables) and
T(tradables). The non-tradable is the numeraire and the exchange rate et is defined
as the tradable price in terms of non-tradables.2 An increase in et represents SOE
currency depreciation. Non-tradable output is used for consumption only. Tradable
output is used for consumption, export and investment. Time is discrete and there
2I abuse the word currency to mean a claim to the numeraire of the economy. Outside the
small open economy, the tradable is the numeraire. In the SOE, every transaction is denoted in
its currency(NT), and world currency(T) is used only in international transactions.
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are two periods: t = 1, 2.
There are five types of private agents: households, non-tradable goods firms,
tradable goods firms, domestic financial intermediaries and FX intermediaries. The
latter are included in the model to introduce uncovered interest rate parity failure.
There are two different types of tradable firms, S(safe) and R(risky). There is a
unit measure of S type indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and another unit measure of R type
indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, there is a central bank that accumulates foreign
exchange reserves by borrowing from the domestic financial intermediary. Figure
2.3 shows flows of funds among agents.
Figure 2.3: Model Outline
Household









T Firm S type
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2.2.1 Households
There is a representative household which consumes baskets of tradable goods
and non-tradable goods (numeraire). χ is the weight on non-tradables in the con-
sumption basket. The household inelastically supplies one unit of labor to non-
tradable and tradable firms each period, and gets labor income w. It smooths
consumption through the ownership of the domestic financial intermediaries.3 The
household earns profits from the domestic financial intermediaries in each period.(πD,t)
They also get profits of tradable goods firms(πS, πR), and FX intermediaries(πX)
which they own in the second period. Non-tradable good firms always break even,
as will be explained later. A lump-sum tax τ is also levied in the second period.
The household’s problem is the following:
max
{CN,t,CT,t}t=1,2
lnC1 + β lnC2 (2.1)
s.t. Ct ≡ (CN,t)χ(CT,t)1−χ (2.2)
CN,1 + e1CT,1 = w1 + πD,1 (2.3)






πR,jdj + πX − τ (2.4)
As the intertemporal decision is made by the domestic financial intermediaries
on behalf of the household, the household faces intra-temporal choice only. The
first order conditions indicates that the household equalizes the marginal utility
3To focus on what is happening in the local bond market when a central bank accumulates
reserves, I assume that the households’ intertemporal decisions are made by the domestic financial
intermediary, as in Benigno and Fornaro (2012). However, the main mechanism of this model is
not affected by households’ participation in the bond market.
50








λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, which equals the house-
holds’ marginal utility of wealth. The λt are used as intertemporal weights for the
profits of the financial intermediaries and tradable good producing firms.
2.2.2 Non-tradable Good Firms
Non-tradable goods are assumed to be produced with a technology linear in
labor with unit productivity. Hence, the wage is equal to the price of non-tradables:
wt = 1. The profit of non-tradable firms is zero.
2.2.3 Tradable Good Firms
There are two different groups of tradable good producing firms, S and R, with
a unit measure each. S type firms are indexed by i, and R type firms are indexed
by j. Each group starts with initial capital (KS,1, KR,1) and debt (BS,1, BR,1) owed
to the domestic financial intermediaries. This is the same for every firm within each
group. All tradable firms share the same decreasing returns Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function. In the following description of their problem, I suppress individual
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firm subscripts i and j.
Y = zKaLb, a+ b < 1 (2.6)
The main difference between the two groups is the second period productivity.
There are two different states in the second period, G(good) and B(bad), with
probability 1 − ψ and ψ, respectively. In a G state, every firm gets the same
productivity z̄, which is the same as first period productivity. No firm defaults. In
a B state, however, ΦS portion of S type firms and ΦR portion of R type firms get
z = 0. If a firm gets zero productivity, it does not produce and defaults on its debt.
The financial intermediary, which loaned to the firm in period 1, recovers nothing.
All the other firms get z = z̄. ΦS is smaller than ΦR (0 < ΦS < ΦR < 1), so that the
default probability in a B state is higher in R type firms than S type firms. Since S
type firms are less risky, their borrowing rate is lower than R types in equilibrium.
Due to the DRS technology, S type firms operate at larger scale than R type firms.
Hence, safe firms become large and risky firms become small in the second period.
Labor is chosen after observing productivity and other prices in each period.













Once the firms choose labor, their profit after production for the first period is
realized as:









Therefore, the tradable firms have no control over their first period profit. Their
problem is to maximize the second period profit by optimally choosing investment
and borrowing.
Firms own capital and augment it through investment. One unit of tradable
good is converted to one unit of capital, and the conversion is irreversible. Firms
can borrow only from the domestic financial intermediary. We assume that internal
funds(first period profits) are not enough to fund firms’ investment, so that firms
need to borrow from the domestic intermediary. Firms pay only the second period
profits to the household. The first period profit, if any, is used soley for investment.




E{λ2π2} = E{λ2(e2Y2 − L2 −B2)} (2.9)




where i is the ex-ante promised interest rate on borrowing. i will be different for each
type of firm in equilibrium. Note that the firms maximize according to household’s
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discount factor λ2.













2 − (1 + i)e1
)}
= 0 (2.11)
Equation (2.11) determines the optimal scale of each firm in the second period.
2.2.4 Domestic Financial Intermediary







BR,1dj = BS,1 + BR,1. It borrows q from the FX intermediary
at risk free interest rate Rf , and buys debt issued by firms and also the central
bank. The intermediary yields profits to the household each period. It maximizes







s.t. πD,1 + S +XS +XR = BS,1 +BR,1 + q (2.13)
πD,2 = Rf (S − q) +RSXS +RRXR (2.14)
S is the quantity of central bank debt bought by the intermediary, while XS, XR are
bonds from each type of firm. Within each group, firms are ex-ante identical, and
4Firms need household’s discount factor to weigh between the profit in good state and the profit
in bad state. Therefore, period 2 marginal utility is used. Using
βλ2
λ1
as the weight does not make
any difference, since the firms do not have control over its first period profit and yield only second
period profit to the households.
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their bonds are also identical. The central bank’s debt and the domestic financial
intermediary’s debt are identical in the sense that both have no risk. Their inter-
est rates are the same in equilibrium and I denote this risk free rate as Rf . The
realizations of RS and RR depend on the period two state:
RS =

(1 + iS), if S=G.
(1− ΦS)(1 + iS), if S=B.
RR =

(1 + iR), if S=G.
(1− ΦR)(1 + iR), if S=B.
In equilibrium the ex-post return of S type bonds is lower than R type bonds
in state G, and is higher than R type in state B. Since R type firms have riskier
technology, their promised interest rate iR is higher in equilibrium than iS (iS < iR).
Therefore, in G state where no firms default, the return is higher in the R group.
Then, the overall return in B state must be higher for the S type, since otherwise
no one will buy debts issued by S type firms. ((1−ΦR)(1 + iR) < (1−ΦS)(1 + iS))
Hence, the S type bond yields better in the bad state, and worse in the good state
compared to the R type bond.





















Note that the risk-free rate Rf is not state contingent, and it is outside the expec-
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tation operator in Eq.(2.15).
2.2.5 FX Intermediaries
The role of the foreign exchange intermediaries in this model is to break Ri-
cardian equivalence. FX intermediaries borrow from abroad in foreign currency and
lend to the domestic financial intermediary in domestic currency. In a frictionless
economy, the FX intermediaries will perfectly undo the central bank’s action in the
international capital market as pointed out in Backus and Kehoe (1989). I deviate
from the frictionless world by imposing a limit to the amount a FX intermediary
can channel to the SOE. This is similar to Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), Fanelli and
Straub (2016) and Amador et al. (2016).
There is a continuum of FX intermediaries. They are labeled by α ∈ [0,∞).
Each intermediary is subject to a net open position limit X, and faces participation
costs. The FX intermediary α active in the domestic bond market is obliged to pay
fixed cost of exactly α. The FX intermediary α chooses how much to invest (xα) in







xα − 1{xα 6=0}α
s.t. xα < X
where R∗ is the world interest rate by which the intermediary funds its investment.
The objective function is linear in xα, hence whenever xα is positive, it would be the
56







X. Then the total foreign capital flow into the domestic bond market is:















The parameter Γ governs the degree of financial openness. If Γ = 0 or X =∞,
then there is no limit in the capacity of individual FX intermediaries, and uncovered
interest rate parity holds. If Γ =∞(X = 0), then the private sector cannot borrow
or lend from the international market and the economy is in financial autarky.
I assume that the fixed costs are paid to each other and that θ portion of the
intermediaries are owned by domestic households, while 1 − θ are owned by RoW.
Then, the profit yielded to the households is:





The central bank issues debt S in domestic currency and exchanges the pro-
ceeds for foreign currency F = S/e1. F is the stock of reserves, and the central
bank saves F abroad at the world interest rate R∗. F is exogenously decided. To
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close the model, the central bank brings back the reserves R∗e2S/e1 from abroad
and pays back the debt RfS in the second period. There could be a gap between the
central bank’s assets and liabilities in period two due to interest rate differentials
and exchange rate variation. To recover its fiscal loss, it levies a lump-sum tax τ on

















LR,tdj = 1 (2.21)
• Non-tradable goods market:
CN,t = LN,t (2.22)
• Risk free bond issued by domestic financial intermediary:
qD = qS (2.23)
I use the same letter q for both FX intermediaries’ choice of lending and the
domestic intermediary’s choice of borrowing, but they are actually indepen-
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dently chosen by the two types of intermediaries and equalized at equilibrium.








e1{YS,1 + YR,1 − (KS,2 −KS,1)− (KR,2 −KR,1)− CT,1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Exports



























The FX market clearing conditions are the resource constraints of this econ-
omy. The conditions are derived by combining the budget constraints of house-
holds and firms. Expressed in domestic currency, they mean that net demand
for SOE currency against foreign currency has to be zero in each period. The
net demand has two components: net exports and portfolio flows. The equi-
librium exchange rate is determined to clear demand and supply of domestic
currency.
Using the constraints and equilibrium conditions, a competitive equilibrium
can be defined as follows.
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Equilibrium Definition5
A competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of allocations (πX , τ, q,KS,2, KR,2, BS,2,
BR,2, XR, XS, {CN,t, CT,t, LN,t, LS,t, LR,t, πD,t}t=1,2) and a price system (Rf , iS, iR,
{λt, et}t=1,2) that satisfy equations (2.3)-(2.5), (2.7), (2.9)-(11), (2.13)-(2.22), (2.24)-
(2.27), given exogenous policy S and the initial conditions (KS,1, KR,1, BS,1, BR,1).
2.2.8 Effect of Reserve Accumulation
This subsection illustrates the effect of reserve accumulation and explains the
mechanism by providing a numerical solution to the model. First, Table 2.2 shows
the model parameterization. The time discount factor β is set to be compatible
with an annual interest rate of 5%. The output elasticities of capital and labor (a
and b) are taken from the capital share and labor share of the 2005 Korean input-
output table. They do not sum to one as the total value added consists of capital
share(operating surplus and depreciation), labor share(wage) and tax. ψ is 0.5 so
that the probabilities of boom and bust are even. In a bad state, the default rate of
S type firms is set to 1%, while it is 10% for R type firms. The financial openness
parameter Γ = 0.1 is from Gabaix and Maggiori (2015).6 θ is chosen to be zero,
so all the FX intermediaries are owned by foreigners and their profits do not flow
into the SOE. Changing θ to one, however, does not change the results qualitatively.
5Note that some equations should be counted two or four times for the two time periods and
two types of tradable firms. The number of equations and unknowns exactly match.
6They document that the number is “in broad congruence with the experience of Israel and
Switzerland during the recent financial crisis.”
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Table 2.2: Parameters and Initial Conditions
Parameters
χ non-tradable goods preference 0.50
β time discount factor 0.95
a output elasticity of capital 0.43
b output elasticity of labor 0.47
z̄ total factor productivity 1.40
ψ probability of Bad state 0.50
ΦS default rate of S-type firms 0.01
ΦR default rate of R-type firms 0.10
R∗ gross world interest rate 1.00
Γ degree of financial openness 0.10
θ portion of FX intermediaries 0.00
owned by domestic households
Initial Conditions
KS,1 initial capital stock of S type firms 0.09
KR,1 initial capital stock of R type firms 0.09
BS,1 initial debt of S type firms 0.20
BR,1 initial debt of R type firms 0.20
The firm size is determined in the second period according to the riskiness
of their technology, and initial capital only matters for the first period aggregate
output. Therefore, I do not differentiate the initial capital of S type and R type
firms. The initial capital was chosen to get a reasonable range of equilibrium interest
rates.
Given an amount of exogeneously chosen reserves F (= S/e1), I can calcu-
late the equilibrium numerically. To see the effect of reserve accumulation, I com-
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pare equilibria with different amount of reserve accumulation. Below, I calcu-
late equilibria with 11 different levels of reserves ranging from zero to 0.1 in for-
eign currency. The GDP measured in foreign currency when there is no reserve
accumulation(F = 0) is 0.84, hence reserve accumulation of 0.1 roughly corresponds
to 12% of GDP.
Figure 2.4: Exchange Rate and Trade Balance





































Figure 2.4 shows the equilibrium exchange rates and trade balances as func-
tions of reserve accumulation. The left panel shows the first period exchange rate.
As the quantity of reserves F increases, the exchange rate rises(depreciates). The
intervention depreciates exchange rate because the central bank supplies local cur-
rency while demanding foreign currency in the FX market, and the private sector
cannot fully offset the central bank’s action.7 The right panel shows that trade bal-
ance in period 1 improves with reserve accumulation. Tradable goods become more
7Adler et al. (2015) discuss the theoretical background and provide empirical evidence on the
effects of FX intervention on exchange rate.
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expensive due to reserve accumulation and the household consumption switches
toward non-tradable goods. As a consequence, net exports increase. Promoting
exports is thought to be one of the main reasons for reserve accumulation, although
it is not explicitly modeled as a motivation here.
Figure 2.5: Ricardian Equivalence Failure


















Figure 2.5 shows portfolio capital flows. The black dotted line shows FX
reserve accumulation from zero to 0.1. It is a 45 degree line. The solid red line shows
the private borrowing from abroad. As reserve accumulation increases, the private
Ricardian response is to borrow more from abroad. As the UIP gap increases, the
private capital inflow does increase. Because of the friction in international capital
intermediation, however, the additional borrowing of the private sector does not fully
offset the public outflows in the form of reserves. Therefore, the slope of private
inflow is less than one in the graph above. In this numerical example, reserve flows
outweigh private inflows after reserve accumulation exceeds 0.06.
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Figure 2.6: Equilibrium Interest Rates


















Figure 2.6 shows the equilibrium interest rates. The solid black line is the risk
free rate. Starting around 0.04, it increases as reserve accumulation increases. The
interest rate paid by S type firms is showed by the blue dotted line and is a little
higher than the risk free rate, as the bonds of S type firms involve some risk. The
interest rate for R type firms is much higher as shown in the red dashed line. Firm
size in the second period is determined by the interest rates they pay. Paying a
lower interest rate, S type firms invest more and become large firms, while R type
firms become small.
Finally, Figure 2.7 shows the main result of differential crowding out effects on
different-sized firms. It presents the amount of capital crowding out of S type firms
and R type firms. The lines show the gap between the capital stock with no reserve
accumulation and the capital stock with the level of reserve accumulation plotted
on the horizontal axis. The blue dotted line is for S type firms, and the solid red
line is for R types. As reserve accumulation increases, the reduction in capital stock
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also increases in both types of firms.
Figure 2.7: Crowded-out Capital




















The most important result is that the crowding out line is steeper for S type
firms(large firms) than for R type firms(small firms). Large firms’ bonds are more
similar to the risk-free sterilization bonds issued by the central bank in two dimen-
sions, expected return and variance of the return. When there is a higher supply
of sterilization bonds, accompanied by a higher risk-free rate, the optimal response
of the domestic financial intermediary is to reduce its holdings of large firms’ bonds
more than small firms, and to hold more risk-free bonds. The model predicts that
large firms’ investment and capital are crowded out more than small firms by reserve
accumulation.
Although fairly stylized, with only two periods, this model has several char-
acteristics different from existing models of reserve accumulation. First, by having
capital and production, this model can analyze the effect of reserve accumulation
65
on investment. Most existing reserve accumulation models are built to explain the
motivations or benefits of accumulating reserves, so that they either abstract from
production and analyze endowment economies, or do not have capital, which would
be pinned down by the world interest rate in a small open economy setup.
Second, this model can illustrate the empirical findings of Alfaro et al. (2014)
that private capital inflows are dominated by much larger public outflows in reserve
accumulating countries. By incorporating segmented international markets, as in
Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) and Fanelli and Straub (2016), in a small open economy
setup, the model of this chapter shows that public outflows and private inflows exist
together, and that public outflows induce additional private inflows that offset the
initial outflows only partially. This feature cannot be achieved with a brute-force
borrowing constraint.
Third, this model shows that policy effects can be different across heteroge-
neous firms. Reserve accumulation reduces available credit. The increased access to
safe central bank assets allows financial intermediaries to take more risk and thus
increase their lending to riskier debtors. The model shows that credit to small firms
is reduced by less than to large firms. The heterogeneous sensitivities of firms yields
an important testable hypothesis which will be examined in the next section.
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2.3 Empirical Evidence
This section tests how reserve accumulation affects financial constraints of
different-sized firms in Korea. Section 2.3.1 reviews the testing framework and re-
lated literature. Section 2.3.2 derives the regression equation. Section 2.3.3 describes
the data used, and Section 2.3.4 checks the performance of the testing framework
by replicating previous literature using the Korean data. Section 2.3.5 documents
the main findings, and Section 2.3.6 does a counterfactual exercise using the main
results. Section 2.3.7 checks robustness of the finding in a dynamic panel regression
setting. The last section 2.3.8 supports the main findings by investigating firms’
interest rates.
2.3.1 Testing Framework
Firm financial constraints ultimately come from information asymmetries and
agency problems. In a frictionless Modigliani-Miller world, there is no difference in
the cost of internal financing and external financing. When frictions exist, however,
external financing becomes more costly than internal financing, so that firms are
financially constrained. Relying on this foundation, one can measure firms’ financial
constraints by examining how sensitive investment is to internal funds. If a firm is
not constrained, its investment would not depend on internal funds per se, since firms
with good investment opportunities can easily switch to external financing to fund
the investments. Conversely, if a firm is financially constrained, then internal funds
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would have explanatory power for its investment even controlling for fundamental
factors affecting optimal frictionless investment.
The idea of using the investment-cash flow sensitivity as a proxy for firm fi-
nancial constraints was first proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988) and it soon created a
large literature. Fazzari et al. (1988) and other related papers find a positive rela-
tionship between investment and cash flow in financially constrained firms, identified
in various ways. While many studies use variations of this methodology to gauge
firm financial constraints, another group of studies questions the validity of this ap-
proach. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that investment-cash flow sensitivities do
not increase monotonically with the degree of financing constraints. Gomes (2001)
and Alti (2003) emphasize other important factors that determine firm investment
such as Tobin’s q or growth rates and argue that mis-measurement of those factors
can result in spurious correlation between cash flow and investment. Most recently,
using U.S. firm data, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015) find that the cash flow
sensitivity measure, along with four other measures, does not identify firms that
behave as if they were constrained.
Despite the controversy, many empirical studies identify firm financial con-
straints via the investment-cash sensitivity and establish findings that are in line
with other independent studies.8 Love (2003) finds that firms in financially devel-
oped countries exhibit lower investment-cash sensitivity than firms in less devel-
oped financial markets. Laeven (2003) shows that financial liberalization lowers the
8For example, Chen and Chen (2012) report that many studies are using investment cash flow
sensitivity despite the controversy, although they themselves find that the sensitivity declined and
disappeared over time.
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investment-cash sensitivity of small firms. Harrison et al. (2004) finds that global
capital flows reduce the investment-cash sensitivity of firms. Similarly, Forbes (2007)
shows that Chilean capital controls made small firms more financially constrained.
She shows that small firms have higher investment-cash sensitivity than large firms,
and that small firms’ investment-cash sensitivity rose significantly during periods
of capital controls. More recently, Erel et al. (2015) use the sensitivity of invest-
ment to cash flow, along with other measures of financial constraints, to show that
acquisitions relieve financial frictions in target firms, using European firm data.
As will be shown later in this section, using the sample of Korean firms, I
also find that small firms have larger investment-cash sensitivity than large firms,
and that investment-cash sensitivity fell significantly after the opening of Korea’s
financial markets. Hence, recognizing the limitations, I proceed to interpret the cash
sensitivity of investment as a proxy of financial constraints.
Standard investment regressions in previous literature are built on Tobin’s q
theory. The q theory, however, has many empirical problems. First, usually the
average q is used instead of unobservable marginal q. It is the marginal q that
determines firm investment, and the marginal q is equal to average q only in very
restrictive cases. Second, one needs stock market valuations to measure average q,
so it is not feasible to get q for unlisted firms. Third, even for listed firms, it is likely
that average q is mis-measured from stock price data. Stock market valuation is not
a reliable measure of average q if the financial market is not well developed or if the
market for that stock is not thick enough. For these reasons, many recent papers
dispense with q theory and directly estimate the investment Euler equation, rather
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than the first order condition that contains marginal q. The goal of this paper is to
contrast large firms with small firms during periods of reserve accumulation. The
data used in this paper has many unlisted small firms, so I follow the Euler equation
approach.
In the following, I use the Euler equation framework and infer that firms are
financially constrained if their investment is sensitive to their cash holdings after
controlling for profitability. I test whether firm financial constraints are associated
with fluctuations of reserve accumulation and investigate whether this association
is stronger for large versus small firms.
2.3.2 Regression Equation
The following derivation of the central estimating equation closely follows Har-
rison et al. (2004) and Forbes (2007). Suppose a firm maximizes the expected sum
of dividends subject to constraints.









s.t. Dt = Π(Kt, ζt)− It − C(It, Kt) (2.29)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (2.30)
Dt ≥ 0 (2.31)
Kt is the capital stock at t, Dt is the dividend, ζt is the productivity shock, Π(Kt, ζt)
is a profit function, and C(It, Kt) is an adjustment cost function. The constraint
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(2.31) prevents external financing. Let λt be the multiplier for this constraint. Then
λt measures the shadow price of external financing. The first order condition and


























One can estimate Eq.(2.32), if there is a proxy for q(= ∂V/∂K). For the
reasons mentioned previously, I instead derive an Euler equation that does not have


















λt is the shadow cost of external financing and (1 + λt+1)/(1 + λt) is the relative
shadow cost of external financing in t + 1 versus t. This can be used as a measure
of financial constraints. If financial markets are complete, then λt = λt+1 and the
term becomes one. If λt > λt+1, however, the shadow cost of external financing is
higher today than tomorrow, which means that the firm is financially constrained
today. We assume that (1 +λt+1)/(1 +λt) is described as a function of firm specific
constraints and the cash-capital ratio at the end of the previous period. To see
9∂C/∂K is a second order effect and I set this to be zero as in Harrison et al. (2004) or Forbes
(2007).
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whether financial constraints are affected by reserve accumulation, we let the impact
of the cash-capital ratio vary with reserve accumulation:
1 + λt+1
1 + λt




where res is reserve accumulation / GDP. Since it would take time for reserve
accumulation to affect firm investment through financial markets, res is lagged
by one year. To test whether the effect is different for different sized firms, the
specification can be adjusted as follows:
1 + λt+1
1 + λt




where dL is a dummy variable for being large.
To get the estimating equation, I must specify the forms of the adjustment








+ αi + αt
]2
Kit (2.37)
For the MPK, I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and estimate MPK
using the sales to capital ratio.
After substituting Eq.(2.35) into the optimality condition (2.34), I assume
rational expectations which allows expected values to be estimated using realized
values. I use salest−1 rather than salest to avoid simultaneity. Taking first order
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Korea is the world’s seventh-largest holder of FX reserves. As of December
2015, Korea held 368.0 billion USD, which amounted to 26.7% of its GDP. At the
beginning of the 1997 financial crisis, however, it was holding only 20.4 billion USD,
3.7 % of GDP. Figure 2.8 shows the trend of Korea’s reserve holdings. The bulk of
the reserve was accumulated during the period 1999-2007. During this period, Korea
increased its reserve stock from 52.0 to 262.2 billion USD, and the reserve-GDP ratio
rose from 13.9% to 23.4%.











1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
Reserve Accumulation(L)
Reserve Stock(R)
(% to GDP)                                                                     (billion USD)        
Notes: The data is from the Bank of Korea. The line shows stock of international re-
serves(right axis). The bar graph shows annual transaction of reserve assets(left axis).
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Therefore, Korea in 1999-2007 provides a useful laboratory to study the effects
of reserve accumulation on private investment. Avoiding two financial crises(the
1997 Asian crisis and the 2008 global crisis), I focus on the time window between
1999 and 2007.
For the measure of reserve accumulation, I use data from the balance of pay-
ment(BOP) statistics. BOP measures international transactions. The “Reserve
Assets” item in BOP measures the change in the reserves stock caused by transac-
tions. It excludes the effects of asset price changes or exchange rate variation, so it
is suitable for the purpose of this study. On average, Korea accumulated 3.2% of
its GDP as reserves each year during the sample period. It accumulated reserves
to varying degrees over this sample period; in 2001 reserve accumulation was 1.4%
of GDP, whereas it was 5.1% in 2004. Thus, this period provides good variation in
reserve accumulation.
The firm data comes from annual financial statements, and covers approxi-
mately all Korean corporations whose asset size is larger than 10 million USD. Those
firms are obliged to report annual statements to the public. Most of the variables
used in the following analysis come from balance sheets and cash flow statements.
The data covers only those firms which are still operating. Firms in the financial
sector or the public sector are excluded from the sample. I also exclude firms with
only one employee and firms whose book closing month is not December. To control
for outliers, I delete observations with unrealistic values, and winsorize key varibles.
Details about the sample selection procedure are described in Appendix B. After
these restrictions, there remain 23,365 firms in the dataset.
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Variable definitions are in Table 2.3. Sector indicators are built based on the
KSIC(Korean Standard Industrial Classification) and there are 40 sectors. Details
are provided in Table B.1 of Appendix B.
Table 2.3: Variable Definitions
Variable Code Definition
Reserve accumulation res ( net reserve purchase / GDP ) × 100
Capital K tangible capital
Investment I net purchase of non-financial assets
Cash holding C cash and cash equivalent
Sales S sales








Asset size asize ln(asset)
Employment size esize ln(number of employees)
Return on equity ROE net income / equity
Before we get into the details of formal measure of firm financial constraints,
I first examine the time series behavior of average investment of the firms in the
dataset. Figure 2.9 shows the average I/K ratio and aggregated I/K ratio of large
and small firms along with the stock of reserves(dashed line). The left panel shows
the average of individual firms’ I/K ratio, and the right panel shows the ratio of
aggregated investment to aggregated capital within each groups of firms. Firms
with average employment size larger than 300 are classified as large firms. Small
firms’ investment recovered soon after the crisis of 1997 while large firms’ investment
continues to be below the before crisis level in both of the graphs. It can be seen
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that the drop in investment shown in Figure 2.1 is mostly driven by large firms
rather than SMEs.











































































Notes: The left axis is for the investment-capital ratio with the formular presented under
each panel. The right axis is for the reserve stock(dashed lines). Top 1% is windsorized in
the panel (a). The red lines are for small firms and blue lines are for large firms. They are
indicated by S and L notation.
2.3.4 Measuring Firm Financial Constraints
I first perform tests used in previous studies to check whether the investment-
cash sensitivity appears to be a reasonable measure of financial constraints in my
sample. Table 2.4 reports a couple of applications of the empirical model. Every
regression in this paper includes firm and Sector × Year dummies. Sector × Year
dummies will absorb sectoral shocks and business cycle factors.
Columns (1) and (2) compare the cash sensitivity of investment in two differ-
ent periods. Korea opened its capital account around 1998 by liberalizing foreign
investment in stocks, bonds and bank deposits.10 There are many studies that show
10CP market: February 1998, CD market: December 1998, bond market: December 1997, stock
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that financial liberalization reduces financial constraints of firms. One can expect
that Korean firms’ financial constraints were alleviated significantly after 1998. The
two columns (1) and (2) compare 1994-1996 and 2000-2007. The test is done on the
same set of continuing firms, therefore the regression coefficients are directly com-
parable to each other. The cash sensitivity of investment is 10.5 in 1994-1996, and
4.0 during 2000-2007. The sensitivity was lowered significantly during the period of
financial liberalization.
Table 2.4: Effect of Financial Openness and Firm Size
(1) (2) (3)
1994-1996 2000-2007 2000-2007
Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 10.49*** 4.049*** 9.617***
(1.0400) (0.3633) (0.9654)
asizeit × Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 -0.530***
(0.0964)




Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
Sector × Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Number of observations 4,243 12,782 59,996
Number of firms 1,624 1,624 14,325
Notes: Dependent variable is (Ii,t/Ki,t−1) × 100. Standard errors in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respec-
tively. Top 5% of I/K, S/K, C/K are windsorized.
market: May 1998
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Column (3) is the same test as in Forbes (2007). It tests whether the cash
sensitivity of investment is different among different-sized firms. One can expect
large firms to be less financially constrained, since they tend to have more collateral
and better access to financial markets. In column (3), asset size is interacted with
cash holdings. The coefficient is negative and significant, meaning that as firm size
gets larger, the cash sensitivity of investment gets smaller.
These results are in line with previous studies, and they support the validity
of using the cash sensitivity of investment as a measure of financial constraints.
Hereafter, I interpret this sensitivity as the degree of financial constraints.
2.3.5 Main Results
Table 2.5 shows the main empirical results of this chapter. Column (1) is
a direct estimation of Eq.(2.38). It does not differentiate by firm size. The cash
sensitivity of investment is 4.215 and it is statistically significant. But the effect of
reserve accumulation on the cash sensitivity is not statistically significant without
firm size differentiation.
Column (2) presents the main result. To see whether the effect of reserve
accumulation is different by firm size, I create a dummy variable dL, which is equal
to one if firms’ employment is larger than 300, and zero otherwise. The Korean
government provides various supports to small and medium sized enterprises, while
large firms are subject to more strict regulation. Employment size 300 is one of
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Table 2.5: Effects of Reserve Accumulation on Firm Financial Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
no size effect 300 200 100
dL × rest−1 × Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 0.587** 0.418** 0.431***
(0.2691) (0.2074) (0.1423)
rest−1 × Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 -0.0401 -0.0802 -0.0913 -0.149**
(0.0631) (0.0648) (0.0661) (0.0715)
Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 4.215*** 4.348*** 4.373*** 4.448***
(0.2463) (0.2528) (0.2585) (0.2791)
dL × Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 -1.881* -1.240* -0.877*
(0.9782) (0.7478) (0.5275)
dL × rest−1 -1.158** -1.135*** -0.905**
(0.4762) (0.4065) (0.3581)
Si,t−1/Ki,t−1 0.526*** 0.525*** 0.525*** 0.525***
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Sector × Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 59,716 59,716 59,716 59,716
Number of firms 14,282 14,282 14,282 14,282
Notes: Dependent variable is (Ii,t/Ki,t−1)×100. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. Top 5% of I/K, S/K, C/K are
windsorized. Employment size 300 corresponds to 94.1 percentile, 200 to 90.4 percentile,
and 100 to 79.6 percentile.
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the key criteria used to officially define SMEs. There are 1,378 firms with dL = 1
in the sample. This is 5.9% of the entire sample, but their sales and investment
amount to 64.6% and 73.7% of the entire sample, respectively. I interact this dummy
variable with rest−1×Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1. The coefficient is 0.587 and is significant. This
means that large firms are more financially constrained when reserve accumulation
is high. For firms with less than 300 employees, dL = 0 and the coefficient on
rest−1 × Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 is negative and insignificant. Hence, there is no statistical
evidence that small firms’ investment sensitivity to cash flow is associated with
reserve accumulation. Column (3) and (4) do the same exercise with different size
thresholds, and the results remain virtually unaffected.
The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that the effect of reserve accumula-
tion is also economically significant. For large firms, the coefficient on Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1
is 2.47. This coefficient measures the financial constraint when there is no reserve
accumulation (res=0). If reserve accumulation increases by one percent of GDP, the
constraint measure rises by 0.587, roughly a 23.8% increase. In contrast, for small
firms, the coefficient is 4.35 and is not affected by reserve accumulation. Put differ-
ently, if reserve accumulation increases from zero to 3.2% of GDP (which is the av-
erage during the sample period), then a large firm with median Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1(=0.15)
reduces its investment-capital ratio by 3.4 percentage points. For small firms, the
effect is not statistically significant.
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2.3.6 Counterfactual Exercise
Using the result in column (2) of Table 2.5, I calculate the aggregate investment
loss due to reserve accumulation. I measure investment loss for each large firm and












The coefficient on rest−1 × Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1, 0.0802, is not included in the calculation
as there is no statistical evidence that the coefficient is different from zero. The
investment losses of large firms due to reserve accumulation are aggregated to be
1.6% of GDP on average per years over 2000 to 2007.11 Put differently, I calculate
that 1% of GDP reserve accumulation reduces aggregate investment by 0.5% of GDP
on average.
The dashed line in Figure 2.10 shows the counterfactual gross fixed capital
formation relative to GDP in the case of no reserve accumulation, starting from
year 2000. The decline in the counterfactual investment is much milder than the
actual statistics.
112000 2.9%, 2001 2.5%, 2002 0.7%, 2003 0.9%, 2004 1.7%, 2005 2.3%, 2006 1.0%, 2007 0.9%
81












1991 1995 1999 2003 2007
Reserves(L)
Gross fixed capital formation / GDP (R)
Counterfactual GFC formation / GDP (R)
(billion USD) (% to GDP)
Notes: The data is from the Bank of Korea. The dotted line shows reserve stock using the
left axis. The red line is the actual gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio. The blue
dashed line shows the counterfactual exercise.
2.3.7 Dynamic Model
Investment is often serially correlated and it is common in investment regres-
sions to include lags of investment as regressors. In this section, I include a lagged
investment-capital ratio as an additional regressor and test robustness of the main
finding. In panel data models, the presence of a lagged dependent variable biases
coefficient estimates. The Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)) ad-
dresses this problem by doing GMM estimation using lagged levels of regressors as
instruments. I follow this approach in the following estimation of dynamic panel
models.
Table 2.6 presents the results. I use a maximum three lags of the lagged
investment-capital ratio as instruments. The coefficients on the lagged investment-
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capital ratios are positive and significant in all three regressions. The first column
shows the impact of reserve accumulation without controlling for firm size. The
coefficient of financial constraints decreases after reserve accumulation. When I
allow the measure of financial constraints to vary with firm size in column (2),
however, it can be seen that large firms’ financial constraints increase while small
firms’ decrease after reserve accumulation. The result in column (2) is not very
different from the main results presented in the previous section.
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggests two tests to check the validity of the GMM
estimator they develop. The Sargan test examines the null hypothesis of no corre-
lation between residual and the instruments used. The lower section of Table 2.6
shows the test results. Sargan test statistics of all three regressions support the va-
lidity of the instruments. A concern is the serial correlation. Arellano-Bond GMM
estimator requires that the error be serially uncorrelated, and this needs to be ex-
plicitly tested. In columns (1) and (2), there are weak evidence of second order serial
correlation in the error term. One way to resolve this problem is to add additional
lags of the dependent variables, which I do in column (3). Adding a second order
lag does remove the serial correlation, but we lose one third of the observations.
As a consequence, the main regressors in the regresson lose statistical significance
although the signs of coefficients stay the same. The magnitude of the coefficients
does not change much neither.
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Table 2.6: Dynamic Model Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Ii,t/Ki,t−1 Ii,t/Ki,t−1 Ii,t/Ki,t−1




dL × rest−1 × Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 0.874** 1.061
(0.4218) (0.6819)
rest−1 × Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 -0.358** -0.426*** -0.360
(0.1549) (0.1644) (0.2357)
dL × Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 -3.064* -4.802**
(1.8260) (2.3049)
dL × rest−1 -0.634* -0.219
(0.3544) (0.4525)
Ci,t−1/Ki,t−1 6.189*** 6.440*** 7.200***
(0.6519) (0.6894) (0.9480)
Si,t−1/Ki,t−1 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.936***
(0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0656)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Number of observations 27,852 27,852 19,726
Number of firms 7,981 7,981 6,084
Sargan test 16.8 17.1 13.5
Serial correlation 1.85* 1.89* 0.95
Notes: Dependent variable is (Ii,t/Ki,t−1) × 100. Standard errors in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respec-
tively. Top 5% of I/K, S/K, C/K are windsorized.
1 Sargan test is the χ2 statistic from the test of the null hypothesis that
the overidentifying restrictions are valid.
2 Serial correlation test is the Z statistic from the null hypothesis that no
second order serial correlation in the residuals.
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2.3.8 Effect on Firm Interest Rate
In this subsection, I test whether firms pay disproportionately higher inter-
est rates after reserve accumulation. Motivated by the model prediction that the
required average rate of return on capital rises more in large firms than in small
firms following an increase in reserve accumulation, I posit that reserve accumula-
tion makes the interest burden relatively heavier for larger firms. It is a daunting
task to identify crowding out effect from changes in the interest rate. The traditional
crowding out literature finds little to no evidence for an effect of government borrow-
ing on private interest rates.12 Recognizing this limitation, I check the correlation
between central bank borrowing and firm level interest rates in my dataset.
I build a proxy of average interest rates, ihat, for each firm and each year
using their liabilities and interest expense over the year. The exact definition is
shown in Table 2.3. As in the previous subsection, I lag reserve accumulation by
one year. The estimating equation is:
ihati,t = δi + δt + β rest−1 · sizei + εi,t (2.40)
Table 2.7 shows the results. Column (1) uses employment size, and column
(2) uses asset size. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive
and significant in both regressions. I interpret the magnitude using the asset size
regression as follows. For a 90th percentile sized firm(asize=10.8), a 3.2 percentage
12In the new Palgrave dictionary of economics(Durlauf et al. (2008)), Blanchard puts it that “...
the effect of government debt on interest rate; empirical evidence, from both across countries and
from the last two centuries, shows surprisingly little relation between the two.”
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point rise in res is associated with an increase in the proxy interest rate of 0.34
percentage points. For smaller firms this effect is smaller. If the firm size is at
the 10th percentile(asize=7.3), then the effect is 0.23 percentage points. Although
the economic significance of the coefficients is rather small, this result supports
the previous financial constraint regressions in the sense that larger firms are more
negatively affected by reserve accumulation.
Table 2.7: Interest Rate Regression
(1) (2)
ihatit ihatit
esizei × rest−1 0.014***
(0.0027)




Firm fixed effects yes yes
Sector × Year fixed effects yes yes
Number of observations 112,803 115,624
Number of firms 19,037 20,123
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes sig-
nificance at 1%. ihat is windsorized at 1% level.
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2.4 Conclusion
This article investigates whether there is investment loss caused by reserve
accumulation. Two different methodologies are used to evaluate the effects of reserve
accumulation on different sized firms’ investment. First, I build a model that shows
that a central bank hinders capital flows to productive sectors by accumulating
international reserves. The effect is larger on large and safe firms which issue debt
securities more substitutable with risk-free sterilization bonds. Second, I investigate
a panel of Korean firms to find that large firms’ cash sensitivity of investment
significantly rises after reserve accumulation, whereas small firms’ sensitivity is not
associated with reserve operations. I also find that large firms’ interest rate tends
to rise more than small firms’ after reserve accumulation. These empirical findings
are consistent with the model prediction.
Although large firms are small in number, their significance in the economy
is large. In the sample, they are about 6% of the sample in number, but their
investment is 73.7% of aggregate investment. The cost of reserves in terms of forgone
investment is economically significant. I gauge the annual investment losses due to
reserve accumulation to be 1.6% of GDP on average from 2000 to 2007 in Korea.
Although reserves may have important benefits, policy makers should also account
for these potential costs on investment.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The model in Chapter 1 yields a closed form solution for every endogenous
variable. The propositions that characterize the competitive equilibrium are derived
by differentiating the endogenous variables by reserve accumulation. To get the





− L2 +Q− e1F = 0 (A.1)
zK1 + zL2 −
1
λ2










= zK1 − L2 − e1 (A.4)
χ
λ2
+ e2 = zK1 + zL2 (A.5)
(A.1) and (A.2) are the resource constraints(FX market clearing conditions) and
(A.4) and (A.5) are home goods market clearing conditions combined with house-
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holds’ optimal behavior. Plugging (A.3)-(A.5) into (A.1) and (A.2), I get the fol-


















































A, B, C and D are the references to the corresponding terms. A unique solution to
this system of equations exists if the coefficients matrix is non-singular.
Existence of a Unique Equilibrium
Within the assumed ranges of parameters, there exists a unique equilibrium.
If the determinant of the coefficient matrix, AD−BC is not zero, then there exists
a unique equilibrium. The determinant is derived as a quadratic function of F :





− z)F + 1 + z
χΓ
(z(1 +R∗) + Γ) (A.8)
The two values of F that make the determinant zero are either negative or greater
than one. We are assuming that FX reserve F cannot be negative, and also it cannot
exceed total exports which is equal to one measured in foreign currency. Therefore,
there exists a unique equilibrium.
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A.2 Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1. (Ricardian equivalence failure) Private capital inflows cannot



















R∗[(Γ− 2)(1 +R∗) + (1 + z)2]
(Γ + (1 + z)R∗ +R∗ΓF )2
(A.9)
In the above, z is assumed to be greater than R∗, hence the numerator of (A.9)
is positive. The denominator is squared term, so (A.9) is positive. It can also be
shown that the denominator is larger than the numerator, hence (A.9) is less than
one within the range of parameters and exogenous variables.
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In the equation (A.10), the terms in the square brackets is a quadratic function of
F . It is straightforward to show that the sum of those terms is negative within the
assumed range of F .
Corollary 1. (Crowding-out coefficient) The model crowding-out coefficient is
calculated as below.
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)
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Proof. From (A.6) and (A.7), the closed form solution for the first period exchange




































(1 + z)R∗2F 2 + 2R∗(1 + z)






(z − 1)R∗ + Γ
Γ
(z −R∗) + 1
χΓ
(z2R∗2 + 2(zR∗ + zR∗2)−R∗ − Γ(R∗z − 1))
]
> 0
The term in front of the square brackets is positive. Inside the square brackets, only
the last two terms are negative, but the absolute size of them are smaller than the
sum of the other positive terms. Therefore, the partial is positive.
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Proposition 4. (Consumption crowding-out) Consumption of both home goods and







Proof. Starting from the first period budget constraint of the household,
e1CF,1 = πB,1 − CH,1











−1. From the Proposition 1, ∂Q/e1
∂F






























Proof. Trade balance of the first period measured in domestic currency is same as
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e1 − e1CF,1. The first term e1 is exports and it is increasing in reserve accumula-
tion(Proposition 3). The second term e1CF,1 is import, and it was shown in the
proof of Proposition 4 that
∂e1CF,1
∂F
< 0. Therefore, exports increases and imports
decreases. Together, trade balance improves.
The five propositions characterize the effect of reserve accumulation on the
competitive equilibrium outcome. They can be summarized in the following national











= CA = FA = e1F −Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑
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A.3 Numerical Illustration of the Model
I include here numerical examples to show how the driving forces work. Table
A.1 shows the chosen parameters. χ is 0.5, so the households weigh home goods
and foreign goods equal. Productivity z is chosen to be 10% greater than the world
interest rate R∗ which is same as one. 0.1 for Γ is following Gabaix and Maggiori
(2015).1 The initial capital stock is chosen to be two to make the exchange rate
around one.
Table A.1: Parameterization
χ z R∗ Γ K1
0.5 1.1 1.0 0.1 2.0
I calculate equilibria with 11 different levels of FX reserve accumulation rang-
ing from zero to one. Figure A.1 shows the results. Each panel corresponds to
Proposition 1 to 5 and Corollary 1. The upper-left panel illustrates Proposition 1.
It shows that private inflows increase with public outflows, but cannot fully offset
the outflows. The upper-right panel shows bank loan crowding out. The middle
panels describes exchange rate depreciation and consumption crowding out. The
bottom-left panel illustrates trade balance improvement. The bottom-right panel
shows the crowding out coefficient. The coefficient is within the range of 0.3 to 0.5
and it is broadly compatible with the empirical finding.
1They note that Γ = 0.1 is in broad congruence with the experience of Israel and Switzerland
during the recent financial crisis.
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Figure A.1: Numerical Illustrations





























































































Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Sample Selection
All firms subject to mandatory external audit under Korean law are included
in the sample; firms established after 2005, firms with employment size smaller than
two, firms with asset size smaller than 2.7 million KRW, firms whose book closing
month is not December are excluded. The sample does not include financial firms
and firms in public/defence sector. In addition, I drop the following unrealistic
observations. The variable definitions are provided in Table 2.3.
• Observations with It/Kt−1 < −100 (529 obs.)
• Observations with St/Kt < 0 (26 obs.)
• Observations with Ct/Kt < 0 (723 obs.)
The resulting sample has 211,324 observations and 23,365 firms. After this selection,
key variables for the regressions are windsorized as described in each regression
tables. The number of firms by sectors is given in Table B.1.
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Table B.1: Industry Classification
Code KSIC Name Firms
Non-manufacturing Sectors 12,542
1 A Agriculture, forestry, fishing 90
2 B Mining, quarrying 77
3 D Electricity, gas, steam, water supply 76
4 E Sewerage, waste management, materials recovery, remediation activities 222
5 F Construction 2,325
6 G Wholesale, retail trade 2,809
7 H Transportation 821
8 I Accommodation, food service activities 343
9 J Information, communications 1,341
10 L Real estate activities, renting, leasing 2,898
11 M Professional, scientific, technical activities 656
12 N Business facilities management, business support services 254
13 P Education 80
14 Q Human health, social work activities 12
15 R Arts, sports, recreation related services 394
16 S Membership organizations, repair, other personal services 144
Manufacturing Sectors 10,823
17 C10 Food Products 486
18 C11 Beverages 66
19 C12 Tobacco Products 7
20 C13 Textiles, Except Apparel 359
21 C14 wearing apparel, Clothing Accessories, Fur Articles 353
22 C15 Tanning, Dressing of Leather , Manufacture of Luggage, Footwear 101
23 C16 Wood Products of Wood, Cork ; Except Furniture 81
24 C17 Pulp, Paper, Paper Products 211
25 C18 Printing, Reproduction of Recorded Media 121
26 C19 Coke, hard-coal, lignite fuel briquettes, Refined Petroleum Products 52
27 C20 chemicals, chemical products except pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals 732
28 C21 Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal Chemicals, Botanical Products 246
29 C22 Rubber, Plastic Products 637
30 C23 Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 481
31 C24 Basic Metal Products 740
32 C25 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery, Furniture 717
33 C26 Electronic Components, Computer, Radio, TV, Communication Equipments 1,444
34 C27 Medical, Precision, Optical Instruments, Watches, Clocks 347
35 C28 electrical equipment 612
36 C29 Other Machinery, Equipment 1,536
37 C30 Motor Vehicles, Trailers, Semitrailers 1,026
38 C31 Other Transport Equipment 268
39 C32 Furniture 87
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